

REGIONAL & INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

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Abstract

Effective international and regional cooperation are key components of Agenda 21 and prerequisites for sustainable development, due to the rapid development of the global economy and the transboundary nature of ecosystems.

After detailing the regional and international setting and issues at stake, this chapter reviews Israel's Agenda 21 and other environmental treaty obligations over this last decade. The authors recognize that the political instability and violence taking place in the region have made cooperation difficult. This chapter concludes, however, that despite the situation, a lack of leadership and political will on regional environmental issues has been shown at different times by all governments and authorities in the region. Though some progress has been recorded, the political echelon have too often held environmental issues, and in particular pollution prevention, hostage to advances in the Peace Process, or either side has too often used them for political point scoring.

The cost of this failure to cooperate on regional environmental issues has directly contributed to the dramatic degradation of key natural ecosystems in Israel and the region. For example, pollution of the Coastal and Mountain Aquifers (key sources of drinking water for both Israelis and Palestinians) and the degradation of sites of global heritage such as the River Jordan and the Dead Sea, could have been avoided or mitigated if the political will and commitment had existed to cooperate regionally for the benefit of the environment.

Environmental justice issues pertaining to the exploitation of scarce transboundary natural resources are also discussed in this chapter. Furthermore, this chapter briefly reviews Israel's international environmental obligations, calls for specific treaties to be ratified prior to the Johannesburg Summit and concludes that specific government policy concerning economic globalization and trade policies have insufficiently

taken into account sustainability considerations. Finally, a set of specific recommendations for action concludes this chapter.

Importance of the issue

The Regional Setting

In the Middle East, in particular, regional cooperation on environmental issues is essential, due to the small size of many of the countries in the region and the fact that two or more peoples share key ecosystems on which much of the development takes place. Key topographic features and related ecosystems are shared with neighboring peoples. Israelis and Palestinians share the Coastal and Mountain Aquifers, Israel's largest ground water source. Israelis, Syrians and Lebanese share the upper reaches of the River Jordan. Israelis, Palestinians and Jordanians share the lower Jordan and the Dead Sea Basin, a unique crossroads of cultural and biological diversity. Israelis, Jordanians, Egyptians and Saudis share the Gulf of Aqaba, the most northern coral reef in the world. Finally, the Eastern Mediterranean, along whose shores more than 70% of the Israeli population lives, is shared with Palestinians, Egyptians, Lebanese, Syrians, Turks and Cypriots. The transboundary nature of these ecosystems and the small size of the countries in the region mean that transboundary pollution issues, be they sewage flow, air pollution or solid waste disposal, require cooperative efforts to protect the shared ecosystems. Scarcity of resources (in particular water and land), require that parties cooperate to avoid over-exploitation, prevent problems of externalities and spillover effects and for the purpose of guaranteeing equity in resource allocation.

In order of importance, the relevant resources affect:

Water Issues:

Over the last decade, water resources have been a contentious issue on the negotiating table of the Peace Process. Israelis and Palestinians claim water rights to the Coastal and Mountain Aquifers, while Israelis, Palestinians and Jordanians all have riparian claims to the Jordan River.¹ For Israelis and Palestinians, these water resources make up close to 100% of their water supply. The Oslo Peace Process and the Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan did seem to bring some concrete advances on water issues between the respective parties during this last decade.² Israel recognized Palestinian

water rights³ and both Jordan and the Palestinians saw an increase in water transferred as a direct result of negotiations.

There remain, however, some 180 Palestinian villages⁴ that are unconnected to water mains and have to rely on water tanks or rainwater harvesting in order to meet their most basic water needs. There is also a disparity in water consumption rates between Israelis and Palestinians,⁵ due in part to Israeli control of the water resources of the Mountain Aquifer under the claim that Israel developed and fully utilized the water resource first by pumping from springs in Israel proper before 1967. Palestinians claim that water allocation rates must be corrected for their benefit because the recharge area of the Mountain Aquifer is largely over the West Bank. The fact remains that average rates of 50 to 80 liters per day per person are insufficient to meet basic Palestinian domestic needs and, according to Agenda 21 principles, they should be increased to 100 liters or possibly 150 liters considering the hot climatic conditions.⁶ Many writers have suggested arrangements whereby water increases to the Palestinians would be compensated by treated sewage to be returned for Israeli agriculture. Despite the violence—and at times virtual collapse of the Peace Process—it is significant to note that, on water supply issues, meetings of the Joint Israeli/Palestinian Water Commission and other water negotiations have never come to a standstill and are informally taking place to this day.⁷

In contrast to water supply issues, very little progress has been evident on the prevention of pollution of shared water resources. Untreated sewage continues to flow out of almost all Palestinian towns and cities,⁸ and many Israeli settlements—and in particular industrial zones—do not adequately treat their sewage to the levels required by Israeli law.⁹ The same is true for the over 250 waste disposal sites dotted all over the West Bank, leaching into the groundwater. Not a single sanitary waste disposal site exists in the West Bank either for the Palestinian communities or for Israeli settler communities.¹⁰

Political point-scoring has prevented progress. Some Israeli governments had linked their approval of sewage facilities or sanitary waste disposal sites in the West Bank with the connection of those facilities to surrounding Israeli settlements. The Palestinian side would then refuse to proceed on the grounds that any such linkage would be seen as *de facto* recognition of settlements. At other times, Palestinian officials had decided simply to refuse cooperation on environment—linking any cooperation to political progress in negotiations. International assistance offered to build sewage treatment plants had therefore been lost, with the result that millions of

cubic meters of raw sewage have continued to flow and pollute the groundwater.¹¹ In times of closure, collected municipal garbage has been dumped outside Palestinian towns for the sake of not driving on Israeli-made bypass roads, or at other times in order to avoid paying a tipping fee to the Israeli authorities that manage the dumpsite.¹² The NIMBY syndrome is also prevalent, as the close proximity of Israeli and Palestinian communities makes the siting of any locally undesired land use (such as wastewater treatment plants or solid waste landfills) a contentious issue for the community affected by it. Outright refusal to work together on pollution prevention issues until the political situation improves was also too often witnessed. The Israeli-Palestinian Committee on the Environment, established under the Oslo Accords, has less than effectively functioned and has not even informally convened for over two years.

The Oslo Interim Agreement that divided the West Bank into Areas A, B and C was never designed to be permanent. The fact that these arrangements continue to exist makes effective environmental management impossible, due to the lack of territorial integrity that they create. An interesting NGO initiative to overcome the political hurdles of environmental protection for the West Bank, advanced the idea that wastewater treatment and related issues, for both the Palestinian populations and Israeli settlements, be dealt with through international private consortia.¹³ In the meantime, pollution from sewage and solid waste continues to contaminate the most important source of drinking water that Israelis and Palestinians possess. One expert forecasts that if current practices continue, in just 20-30 years the waters of the Mountain Aquifer, the best quality drinking source in the region, will be so polluted that they will no longer be fit for domestic consumption.¹⁴

The Dead Sea Basin:

The Dead Sea Basin, shared by Israelis, Palestinians and Jordanians, is the lowest place on earth, where the saltiest large water body on the globe is found (ten times saltier than the Mediterranean Sea). The Dead Sea is rich in mineral compounds that make it both famous as a natural spa, as well as attractive to industry. It is located in the Great Rift Valley at the crossroads, not only of human civilization, but also of biodiversity—linking European, Asian and African species. Despite its unique features, development around the Dead Sea has been based on unsustainable competition for its resources by both Israel and Jordan, and by the different interests that exploit those resources—agriculture, the mineral extraction industry and tourism. The failure on the part of the Israeli and Jordanian governments to recognize the ecological limits of water subtraction has resulted in unregulated com-

petition. This has devastated the Dead Sea, with a third of its surface level drying up and the sudden creation of land craters: these sinkholes have appeared where land is collapsing due to human interference with the natural water balance.¹⁵ NGOs have led a major campaign to save the Dead Sea and promote sustainable development for the basin through developing the concept of World Heritage and Biosphere registration for the area.¹⁶ Though some government ministries are now supportive and while some progress is in the works, political will is still lacking to actually implement changes on the ground and reverse an ongoing ecological tragedy.

Gulf of Aqaba:

Israelis, Jordanians, Egyptians and Saudis share the Gulf of Aqaba, which was formed from the same fault line that created the Dead Sea. The Gulf of Aqaba is the northernmost coral reef in the world, an underwater paradise with nearly 1000 species of tropical fish and 230 varieties of coral, surrounded by high desert mountains on either side.¹⁷ Over-development—particularly at the head of the gulf, by the cities of Aqaba and Eilat (tourism and industry)—has here too placed the future of this unique ecosystem at risk.¹⁸ On the Israeli side, NGO action managed to stop raw sewage from Eilat flowing into the gulf.¹⁹ The Israeli decision earlier this decade to allow fish farms to be built off the coast of Eilat, resulting in similar amount of nutrients to be emitted as the prior sewage outflow, remains highly controversial.²⁰ Transboundary NGO action has encouraged both Aqaba and Eilat municipalities to publicly express their objection to the fish farms, in recognition that they are polluting their common waters. Because the cities of Eilat and Aqaba are at the southern edges of their respective countries, from a cooperative perspective they are less influenced by the politics of the region. Therefore, effective cooperation has been able to proceed both in terms of oil spill prevention, NGO public awareness and monitoring of the gulf's unique reefs. The survival of the coral reefs and the promotion of sustainable development in this unique desert ecosystem are, however, far from guaranteed, and will require political commitment and continued environmental cooperation. In this regard, Arab objections should be lifted, permitting Israel to become a party to the 1982 Jeddah Convention, formally known as the Regional Convention for the Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Environment.

The global economy, global environmental cooperation and Israeli responsibilities

International cooperation is specifically referenced in Chapter 2 of Agenda 21, which details the commitment of developed countries to assist developing countries. Issues such as mutually supportive environment and trade policies, debt relief and the obligation to provide financial aid to the developing world are all detailed in Agenda 21.

Although Israel is a small country in size, with a relatively modest population of presently just over 6 million people, its impact on the global economy and exploitation of the world's natural resources is disproportionately high, reflective of its developed economy. Like many developed countries, it has not conceived a strategy to combat its disproportionate consumption of natural resources. Although a recent NGO/Ministry of the Environment initiative does seek to advance the concept of sustainability and ecological footprint, most government circles in Israel are ignorant of the concept and it is unfortunately not integrated into decision-making.²¹

The obligation to meet international treaty and convention commitments related to the environment, is part and parcel of meeting one's international responsibilities regarding the environment and sustainable development. For the most part, Israel has taken its international environmental obligations very seriously, not ratifying a convention before it is certain that it will comply with its terms. Though Israel is therefore a signatory to most international environmental conventions, it is lagging behind in fully implementing the amendments and protocols on some key agreements. Despite an undertaking in Monaco in November 2000 to accept the amendments to the **Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and Coastal Region of the Mediterranean** and several of its protocols, to the date of publication of this Shadow Report, acceptance has yet to take place.²² Similarly, Israel has yet to ratify the **Kyoto Protocol** concerning climate change, or the 1997 Amendment to the **Montreal Protocol**, concerning the protection of the ozone layer.²³ Further, Israel decided not to join the **Aarhus Convention**,²⁴ nor sign on to the **Cartagena Biosafety Protocol**.²⁵ Both are important conventions that would well compliment Israel's existing legislation on the public's right to know. Since Israeli industry is increasingly seeking to be active in biotechnology issues, it is of utmost importance that the government agree to comply with the international treaty that regulates such activity.

Critique of Government Report to WSSD

Cooperation at regional level

The Israeli Government Report to the WSSD does touch cursorily upon regional environmental issues and gives some positive examples of cooperation, such as a program to clean up oil spills in the Gulf of Aqaba. However, there is no discussion in the report of the importance of regional cooperation in the Middle East context, as indispensable for the promotion of sustainable development as envisaged under Agenda 21. While a just and fair settlement of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is urgently required, the resolution of the conflict cannot be a prerequisite for environmental cooperation between the respective authorities. The irreversible nature of the damage currently being done to the environment in the region, at the expense of both present and future generations, must be the true focus of concern.

Over the last decade, depending on the current state of political affairs, Environment Ministers from both Israel and the Palestinian Authority have done too little to create effective cooperation on environmental issues. In comparison, civil society groups from all sides have been at the forefront of cooperative endeavors on environmental issues, throughout all the ups and downs of the peace process.²⁶ Awareness campaigns, and research undertaken on environmental health issues, bird migration and shared ecosystems (such as the Dead Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba), as well as common environmental education programs, have brought measured benefits to the respective communities. Civil society groups have indeed been the catalyst behind most of the cooperation that has taken place at the government level and have been exemplary in their message that the environment cannot wait and that the people of the region can work productively together towards a common goal.

All parties in the region need to recognize that the lack of regional cooperation in the government arena on environmental issues will have an impact for generations to come, well after peace is finally obtained. The environmental consequences of non-cooperation need to be assessed, by all sides to the Middle East conflict, as an additional and heavy cost to pay for the non-resolution of the political conflict in the region. Greater international support and intervention is needed, especially by international environmental and developmental institutions, particularly since much of the rich environmental and cultural landscape of the ‘Holy Land’ is much valued worldwide. The fact that both the Israeli and Palestinian

environmental authorities recently agreed to a UNEP desk study and mission to the region is an important step that might lead to renewed dialogue and intergovernmental cooperation, so urgently required.

Blanket support for liberalization

It is disappointing that the Government Report to the WSSD expresses across-the-board support for trade liberalization, deregulation, and privatization policies, without any recognition of their impact on environmental and social issues. This is contrary to the more balanced approach to trade and environment promoted under Agenda 21. The concern expressed here is that an unbalanced approach will lead to further concentration of wealth, further handicapping of minority groups, unsustainable consumption and production patterns, and the accelerated depletion of the natural resource base.²⁷ In all sectors—be they water, air quality or open spaces—the economic incentives promoted by neo-liberal policies such as trade liberalization have, for many parameters, moved Israel further away from sustainable development over the last decade.

Trade liberalization at the bilateral and regional level:

At the bilateral and regional level, government policies (particularly those associated with the advance of the Peace Process) have promoted trade liberalization without sufficiently taking into account environmental and social considerations. The building of industrial estates near border areas between Israel and Jordan, and Israel and the PA, has insufficiently taken into consideration the loss of open spaces and damage to unique cultural and natural sites. The building of an industrial estate by the banks of the River Jordan despite tentative World Heritage nomination for the site, is an unfortunate example of how short-term political and economic interests are being advanced at the expense of sustainable development.²⁸ Lower environmental standards in neighboring countries require agreements that would ensure the upward harmonization of environmental standards when undertaking cross-border economic activity, including adequate guarantee of worker's social rights.

At the Euro-Mediterranean level, Israel is a signatory to an association agreement with the European Union and is committed to the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Zone (MFTZ) as part of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. This is despite the absence of adequate environmental measures in place to guarantee that environment and trade issues are mutually supportive, as required under Agenda 21. Real concerns for

the creation of pollution havens exist due to the unbalanced approach taken by the Euro–Mediterranean partnership.²⁹ A recent hearing in the Israeli Knesset, however, has sponsored debate that Israel should legislate for sustainability assessments to be mandated prior to the signing of any free trade agreements, including the creation of the MFTZ. Initial support has been noted from the Ministry of Environment for this measure, and all parties await the opinion of the Israeli Commissioner for Future Generations, who was requested to prepare an opinion on the issue to the Knesset Economic Committee.

Israeli Assistance to Developing Countries

Though assistance to developing countries is mentioned in the Government Report to the WSSD, Israel is not allocating anywhere near the Agenda 21 target of 0.7% of GNP from its own national budget for development assistance. In 2000, Israel reported its overseas assistance as 0.15% of GNP, though this figure included sums spent on assistance to new immigrants coming to Israel from developing countries (former USSR states and Ethiopia).³⁰ Without assistance to new immigrants, the figure of support by Israel is as low as 0.087%. It is unfortunate that proposed legislation in 2000, aimed at ensuring that Israel mandate increased support to development assistance, was rejected by the government.

As to the nature of the assistance given by Israel, much of it is in the agricultural sector, often supporting agricultural policies that seek to combat desertification. Although Israeli technology and expertise has considerable benefit to the agricultural sector in developing countries in promoting water efficiency, it will encourage unsustainable development if it fails to take into account sufficiency and carrying–capacity considerations. There is a need for Israeli legislation mandating sustainability assessments of all Israeli foreign assistance.

What is not mentioned in the Government Report?

Environmental justice issues between Israelis and Palestinians

The words “Palestinian” or “Palestinian Territories” do not receive any mention in the official Government Report. Since Israelis and Palestinians in practice share the same land, from an ecological perspective there can be little meaningful discussion about sustainable development issues in Israel without mention of Palestinians and their development needs and impacts.

It is the opinion of the authors that any solution to Israel's environmental problems cannot be found in isolation from those of the rest of the region, and hence regional environmental issues should have received focused attention in the Government Report. In many cases, Israeli development actions impede sustainable development in Palestinian areas and, in some cases, especially in relation to sewage flows, Palestinian development actions impede sustainable development in Israel.

The principle of environmental justice is key to sustainable development and must be applied to the regional as well as the national level. Reaching a state where both land and water resources are fairly shared by Israelis and Palestinians goes to the heart of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Each side needs to recognize the other's right to live on the land and share its resources in accordance with sustainable principles. At this time of continuing violence between the two peoples, environmental justice issues are so heightened that they often become humanitarian issues. For example the provision of drinking water to all Palestinian cities and villages at all times must be a minimum requirement guaranteed by Israeli military action even in response to a violent "Intifada". A recent report of the World Bank estimated damage to Palestinian infrastructure after the April and May 2002 Israeli military strike at \$360 million.³¹ Damage to water, sewage and solid waste infrastructure alone was estimated at over \$15 million.

Transboundary avoidance of Israeli environmental laws

Real concern is expressed on what appears to be a strategy by some government ministries to avoid Israeli environmental laws by either moving large development projects to neighboring countries or initiating joint projects by establishing facts on the ground in the neighboring country. Israeli government officials have publicly justified the proposed building of the Red–Dead Canal wholly in Jordan as a means to avoid the 'impediment' of the Israeli environmental community. Commencement of the building of the Jordan Gateway Industrial Project on the Jordanian side of the River Jordan, well before deliberations in the Israeli planning process and in spite of heated objections by the environmental community, including initially the Environment Ministry, goes contrary to the spirit of cooperation and the spirit of the Treaty of Peace between Israel and Jordan. Too often in the search for peace, and in the belief that concrete joint economic projects will cement that peace, environmental issues have been quickly pushed aside.

Israeli corporate accountability

Should the movement of Israeli industry out of Israel into neighboring countries become more pronounced, there will be a need to impose corporate accountability principles on Israeli industries moving plant facilities to neighboring countries or indeed anywhere else in the world. A good example of initial responsibilities to be imposed on local companies relocating plants overseas is the recently ratified US–Jordan Free Trade Agreement. Under this agreement, US companies must apply at least some of the more strict US environmental standards when investing in Jordan. The same and more extensive accountability principles should be imposed on Israeli companies investing in the region and in developing countries in particular.

Recommendations

In order for Israel to better meet its Agenda 21 and other international environmental obligations, the authors call for the following:

- Israel should encourage third party support to try to reactivate inter-governmental transboundary environmental cooperation. With forecasts that, by 2030, if current pollution levels continue on the Mountain Aquifer (Palestinian and Israeli), the waters will be so polluted that they will not even be drinkable, a crisis is in the making and must be avoided.
- Israel and her neighbors should develop a specific regional sustainability strategy, with targets, timelines and commitment of financial resources. The strategy must deal with urgent issues, such as equitable water allocation (most urgently to the 180 Palestinian villages still not connected to any water system), protecting shared water resources (sewage and solid wastes) and sustainable management of shared ecosystems, such as the Gulf of Aqaba, Dead Sea and Eastern Mediterranean coastline.
Mechanisms should be established to overcome the problems posed by the existence of different zones of political control (Areas A, B and C) established under the Oslo Accords.
If, at this time, this process cannot be undertaken regionally, then Israel should launch this process unilaterally with full public discussion, and seek to include neighboring countries' participation as soon as practical.

- Greater efforts should be made by Israel to ensure that military actions do not destroy Palestinian infrastructure essential for environmental protection and natural resource management. Clear instructions must be given to the military not to damage water pipes, sewage infrastructure or water tanks, and not to cut down trees; garbage collection and disposal to appropriate sites must be maintained. Investigation of alleged breaches should take place with prosecution of offenders.
- Specific agreements need to be entered into between Israel and her neighbors with the aim of upward harmonization of environmental standards for joint projects. This is due to the concern that lower environmental standards are attracting Israeli business to neighboring countries.
- Sustainability assessments need to be undertaken prior to Israel's signing of additional trade agreements, including an assessment of the environmental and social impacts in Israel of the existing WTO and MFTZ trade agreements already signed.
- Corporate accountability legislation needs to be promulgated to regulate the activities of Israeli-owned business overseas, with the aim of setting minimum environmental and social standards when investing in the developing world.
- Israel needs to set a timetable to meet Agenda 21 commitments on foreign assistance. An environmental review of current Israeli development assistance is needed to ensure that sustainable policies are being promoted, particularly in agriculture.
- Israel is called upon to ratify, preferably prior to the Johannesburg Summit, international environmental agreements such as the amendment to the Barcelona Convention and its protocols, the amendment to the Montreal Protocol, and the Kyoto Protocol, and sign on to the Aarhus Convention and Biosafety Protocol.

¹ For a good overview of the issues, see Longerman and Brooks: *“Watershed—The role of fresh water in the Israeli Palestinian conflict,”* International Development Research Center (IDRC), 1994.

² UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office: *“Water in the Middle East Peace Process,”* May 2000.

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- ³ Israeli–Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (The Oslo Peace Accord), 1995, Article 12 deals with environmental protection and Article 40 deals with water and sewage.
- ⁴ Nassereddin, chapter 7 in Feitelson and Haddad, “*Management of Shared Ground Water Resources*,” IDRC, 2000
- ⁵ Israeli water consumption rates are 280–300 liters per person per day while Palestinian rates are 50–80 liters on average. See Kliot, “Environmental Conflicts and Environmental Security—Israeli and Palestinian Perspectives”, *Studies in the Geography of Israel*, Vol. 16, 2002 (Forthcoming, Hebrew).
- ⁶ Ibid.
- ⁷ UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office: “*Water in the Middle East Peace Process*,” May 2000.
- ⁸ Palestinian Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, “*Water and Wastewater Existing Situation, Regional Plan for the West Bank Governorates*” 1998.
- ⁹ Kliot: “Environmental Conflicts and Environmental Security—Israeli and Palestinian Perspectives”, *Studies in the Geography of Israel*, Vol. 16, 2002, (Forthcoming, Hebrew).
- ¹⁰ Ibid. See also issue of illegal dumping of Israeli solid wastes in Palestinian Areas in Eyal Artzi, Shadow Report Chapter “Environmentally Sound Management of Solid Waste.”
- ¹² Ibid.
- ¹³ WECUP: “*Regional Peace Initiative*”, 2002
- ¹⁴ Kliot: “Environmental Conflicts and Environmental Security—Israeli and Palestinian Perspectives”, *Studies in the Geography of Israel*, Vol. 16, 2002 (Forthcoming, Hebrew).
- ¹⁵ Geographical Institute of Israel, “*Concealed Sinkholes Detection in the Dead Sea Area*” May 2000 and *Maariv Newspaper* article, “The Next National Disaster”, 22 June, 2001 (Hebrew)
- ¹⁶ FoEME: “*Let the Dead Sea Live—Concept Document*”, 2000.
- ¹⁷ Philip Warburg, Editor, “*Protecting the Gulf of Aqaba*,” Environment Law Institute, 1994.
- ¹⁸ Atkinson: “*Evaluation of Pollution in the Gulf of Eilat*”, Report for Israeli Ministries of Infrastructure, Environment and Agriculture, December, 2001.
- ¹⁹ Munir Adgham, chapter 20, in Philip Warburg, Editor, “*Protecting the Gulf of Aqaba*,” Environment Law Institute, 1994.
- ²⁰ Atkinson, “*Evaluation of Pollution in the Gulf of Eilat*”, Report for Israeli Ministries of Infrastructure, Environment and Agriculture, December, 2001.
- ²¹ See David Dunetz, Shadow Report Chapter “Education for a Sustainable Society in Israel” and Yaacov Garb, Shadow Report Chapter, “Population Dynamics and Sustainability in the Israeli context”.
- ²² See GreenPeace, *National Profiles Report to Monaco Conference of the Parties, Barcelona Convention*, November 2001 and see, UNEP/MAP website under “Status of Signatures and Ratification” at www.unepmap.org.

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- ²³ For a detailed discussion see Philip Warburg, Shadow Report Chapter, “Air Pollution, Ozone Depletion and Global Warming.”
- ²⁴ [The UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters](#), June 1998.
- ²⁵ The Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity adopted a supplementary agreement to the Convention known as the [Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety](#) on 29 January 2000.
- ²⁶ See IPCRI, “*Our Shared Environment Conference Reports*”, 1994, 1995 and 1996
- ²⁷ For more information see, Shadow Report Chapters, Raid Fadila and Marganit Ofir-Guntler: “Minorities in Israel” and Barbara Swirski “Combating Poverty.”
- ²⁸ FoEME, “*World Bank Support for Gateway Project: The Beginning of the End for a Holy River*,” 2000.
- ²⁹ FoEME: “*Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Zone: Implications for Sustainability-Research Study*”, 2000.
- ³⁰ State of Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics: “*2000—Report on Foreign Assistance*,” 2000 (Hebrew).
- ³¹ World Bank: “Estimate of Physical/Institutional Damage, West Bank,” March-April, 2002.