

## Foreword

With this publication, the Heinrich Böll Foundation reprints Julianne Smith's essay on "New Accents in Transatlantic Relations" plus a new introduction that makes initial assumptions on policy changes after September 11. The strong emotional and political reactions on both sides of the Atlantic to the terrorist attacks against the United States have proven how solidly the transatlantic relationship is based. However, assumptions on what the events of September 11 should mean for the global security architecture and for multilateralism as such differ widely. The author gives her perspective that stems from a professional history on both sides of the Atlantic and from a sound scepticism towards the notion of an automatic rebirth of multilateralism.

Julianne Smith, who is a program officer with the German Marshall Fund of the United States, has worked with a number of U.S. and German policy research institutions. "New Accents in Transatlantic Relations" discusses how differently both sides approach multilateral institutions like NATO, the OSCE and the UN system. The author's new introduction explains how the European Union is trying to shape its response to September 11 inside and outside of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) - a still elusive institution for Europe's transatlantic partners. The ESDP might not yet have managed to coordinate the policies of the EU's member states in the aftermath of September 11. However, the EU plays a leading role in her member states' policies in the Middle East, in putting forward the political responses to new security threats at home and in coordinating humanitarian action.

September 11 has made it clear that there will no more be two zones of different security in the world. The democratic, rich and save countries of the North cannot insulate themselves from lawlessness, poverty and insecure countries in other world regions. The current effort of the United States and its allies to fight terrorism, its supporters and its support structures in a multilateral coalition and with a mix of military, economic, diplomatic and humanitarian instruments should lead to a new global security architecture and replace, step by step, regional arrangements that have separated the world in safe and unsafe places. The complexity of this strategy and the character of the multilateral approach as such implies that any new security framework will not rely on military and geopolitical components alone but has to include a broad range of reforms in governance and international cooperation.

This raises the question whether the new global security architecture will replace current globalisation tendencies or be integrated with them. The economic globalisation of the last decade has been criticised for doing damage to the environment and the poor. Institutions that play a prominent role in globalisation, like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organisation were accused to lack democratic accountability. It is an open

question, whether the new emphasis on regional stability and security will enforce current globalisation trends or lead to a stronger focus on human development, social cohesion and good governance in developing countries.

To make the double nexus between a new international security architecture, globalisation and sustainable development, is partly an intellectual exercise. A vague awareness exists, that unsustainable development patterns are intensified by globalisation patterns and thereby increasingly contribute to regional instabilities. The task of the environment and development movements will be however, to develop concrete proposals and instruments on how to redefine this double connection.

Globalisation critical movements had picked up momentum after a series of campaigns around the WTO ministerial conference in Seattle, the EU Summit in Göteborg and the G7 Summit in Genova. The movement had always criticised current U.S. economic policy to contribute significantly to some of the negative aspects of globalisation. The U.S. has also been accused of throwing their weight around in international institutions and blocking progress in others. But globalisation critical movements have not only criticised current U.S. policies but also willingly and unwillingly nourished an anti-american ideology. The fashionable Anti-Americanism of certain parts of the anti-globalisation left is mirrored by parallel developments on the extreme right. Both accuse the „Americans“ of worshipping a materialistic live that stands in stark contrast to the post materialistic values of the globalisation critics and to old traditional cultures both in Europe and in Third World countries.

After September 11, this pattern of argument presents itself in a different context. Naomi Klein, author of "No Logo", an acclaimed overview of the anti-globalisation movement, writes in The Nation (October 22) that "tactics that rely on attacking - even peacefully - powerful symbols of capitalism find themselves in an utterly transformed semiotic landscape." Other activists might put it less eloquently, but the cancellation of planned protests even before the annual World Bank/IMF meeting was cancelled, has shown, that the anti-globalisation movement is deeply unnerved. At a moment, when everybody states their public solidarity with the American people, it is almost impossible to paint America as a symbol for everything that is unjust in the world economic order.

However, it might be even more dangerous, if the anti-globalisation movement tries to capitalise on the expected protests against the U.S. led war in Afghanistan. Both the, to a relevant part U.S. led and sponsored, international NGO movement and the UN system will suffer, if globalisation critical movements continue to cristallize around an anti-American ideology. Rejecting the ideology of Anti-Americanism is a precondition for globalisation critical movements to enter into a renewed democratic debate with the U.S. government on how the reduction of poverty and the erection of global governance structures can contribute both to global economic development and global security.

It is frequently being stated that, in the aftermath of September 11, the United States and others will rejoin the system of international cooperation. Such a rebirth of multilateralism could provide fertile ground for a „global deal“ between environmental interests of the so called „North“ and development interests of the „South“.

However, the current cooperation of the U.S. government with the UN Security Council and the ad hoc coalition with app. 35 countries to combat terrorism will not automatically inspire a stronger U.S. engagement in other multilateral processes.

There has been a debate whether September 11 will motivate the U.S. administration to rethink their recent unilateral policies and to return to the multilateral approach of the Clinton administration. In fact, after the terrorist attacks, the U.S. paid their UN dues, turned to the Security Council for a mandate and asked their allies to invoke Article 5 of the NATO treaty. However, doubts have been raised whether the current U.S.-effort to build an international coalition against terrorism is more like a multilateralism "a la carte". Some say, that the U.S. has and will always prefer the flexibility of issue oriented bilateral arrangements to multilateral treaties and institutions.

It is definitely true that average U.S.-Americans have re-discovered the rest of the world. Whether this increased interest in other countries in the complexities of international relations will translate either in a higher willingness to help developing countries and get involved in international institutions or in a tendency to isolate the U.S. against newly perceived threats (e.g. through higher defense spending) has to be shown. Both internationalists in the U.S. and other countries have a window of opportunity to prove to the U.S. that international cooperation is both indispensable and can achieve a positive impact on U.S. national interests.

As Julienne Smith writes, "(...) the terrorist attacks on September 11<sup>th</sup> did not erase any of the challenges that the transatlantic relationship faced on September 10<sup>th</sup>". Managing global change and its security implications is one of them. With this publication, the Heinrich Böll Foundation seeks to contribute to a debate on how to rise to those challenges.

Sascha Müller-Kraenner  
Director

December 2001

## **September 11<sup>th</sup> and Transatlantic Relations: Defining Moment or Déjà Vu?**

Within hours of the terrorist attacks on September 11<sup>th</sup>, America was inundated with an outpouring of grief and sympathy from Europe. European friends and relatives sent messages via email, fax, and phone. CNN aired footage of thousands of Germans gathering around the Brandenburg Gate proclaiming, “Ich bin ein New Yorker.” Le Monde ran the headline: “We are all American.” The Queen’s Guard played the Star Spangled Banner outside of Buckingham Palace. And the citizens of Slovakia floated paper boats bearing the words “we are all in the same boat” in ponds and lakes around the country. Regardless of the medium, the overarching message was clear: Europe stood in complete solidarity with the United States.

Months later, Europe still stands in solidarity with the United States. European leaders continue to descend on Washington, delivering messages of support, financial contributions, and troop commitments for U.S. efforts to deter, dismantle, and destroy terrorist networks. At first glance, the transatlantic relationship looks strong and united. Transatlantic disputes over bananas, GMO’s, the death penalty, ESDP, and missile defense, which have been dominating headlines for over a year, appear to be a thing of the past. Many on both sides of the Atlantic, including Germany’s Foreign Minister, have been quick to herald post-September 11<sup>th</sup> as the beginning of a new era of cooperation and partnership in transatlantic relations.

Upon closer examination, however, the transatlantic relationship shows signs of strain, which could very well take the form of thorny disagreements in the near future. Despite repeated statements of the contrary by senior officials, Europe and the United States are far from agreeing on fundamental questions of leadership, mission, and strategy in regards to the war on terrorism. In fact, the two sides of the Atlantic are not even sharing the same lexicon.<sup>1</sup> Headlines in American newspapers continually refer to the coalition’s “war on terrorism,” while European headlines regularly cite “the U.S. attacks on Afghanistan.”

Unity and solidarity might have been the leitmotif in the days immediately following the attacks, but just as during the Kosovo conflict, the United States and Europe are beginning to formulate two different sets of assumptions and expectations. The challenge will be to work through the differences in order create innovative and effective policies for tackling an enemy unlike any other the West has ever faced. Failure to do so could very well set Europe and the United States on a collision course, one that would significantly weaken the West’s ability to fight and prevent future acts of terrorism.

### **European Assumptions and Expectations**

In the first few weeks following the terrorist attacks, Europe and the United States began to make some assumptions about what types of lessons the other side would draw from the horrific series of events on September 11<sup>th</sup>. Many of those assumptions have amounted to wish lists of policy changes that one side of the Atlantic expects from the other. In some cases, those wishes have

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<sup>1</sup> Several European officials from both Western and Eastern Europe have cautioned against using the term “war,” which in Europe, is reserved exclusively for reference to military combat. Americans, however, are much more comfortable with the term and use it frequently to describe campaigns to prevent something from occurring (i.e., the war on drugs, the war on poverty, the war on AIDS, etc.)

come true -- or at least started to move in the anticipated direction of change. In other cases, the transatlantic relationship is setting itself up for disappointment.

In Europe, a number of politicians and policymakers were hopeful in the days following the terrorists attacks that the Bush Administration would reverse what they perceived to be a unilateralist direction in foreign policy. With such an overwhelming task ahead of it, European thinking went, the Bush Administration would have to reconsider its knee-jerk aversion to international treaties. Many in Europe, particularly Germans, were expecting nothing short of a new global common purpose that would require a full U.S. commitment to multilateralism – not “a la carte multilateralism” as Richard Haass at the State Department dubbed it.

Unfortunately, at least from a European perspective, the United States has failed to signal any major shifts toward a stronger policy of multilateralism, although Europeans have welcomed two recent developments. First, Europe has appreciated the Bush Administration’s tempered approach to the war on terrorism.<sup>2</sup> Despite predictions of an immediate and reckless military response, the United States waited almost four weeks before launching a bombing campaign over Afghanistan and had a humanitarian assistance plan in place when it did decide to act. Powell’s doctrine of “diplomatic opportunity,” which drove his impressive coalition building efforts, created what the *New York Times* dubbed “a careful and methodical response.” Europe noticed.

Second, for a politician who campaigned on promises of curtailing U.S. commitments in Bosnia and Kosovo, President Bush has shown a remarkable new interest in nation building, urging Congress to make funds available so that the United States can contribute to the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. Suddenly, promoting democracy and building capable states doesn’t seem to be such a grave misuse of American resources and the U.S. military. This new enthusiasm for nation building has been well received by Europeans who have frequently berated the United States for its distaste for peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.

The real question, though, is whether or not these two developments actually signal any lasting changes in U.S. foreign policy. Powell himself has said that the attacks on America “hit the reset button” on U.S. foreign policy. To be sure, U.S. relations with China and Russia certainly look different than they did before September 11<sup>th</sup> but what about the transatlantic relationship? Will September 11<sup>th</sup> really deliver Foreign Minister Fischer’s anticipated “new era of cooperation and partnership?” Or are the changes we are witnessing today simply case specific?

In some ways, it is far too soon to tell, although it seems quite clear that major shifts in U.S. foreign policy (at least those that many Europeans have in mind) are unlikely. While the United States deserves kudos for its efforts to form an international coalition against terrorism, there isn’t any indication that the Bush Administration’s newfound interest in coalition building and nation building will transfer to other international challenges such as global warming, the International Criminal Court, arms control, or AIDS in Africa. And even within the current coalition against terrorism, many European policymakers are already complaining about the lack of consultation. From the start, U.S. allies were told that they were either “with us or against us,” leaving little room for allied reservations or input on any particular course of action.

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<sup>2</sup> It should be noted, however, that Europe has remained concerned that the bombing campaign lacks an adequate political strategy.

Instead of instigating dramatic policy changes, then, it seems that current transatlantic debates on the fight against terrorism are merely highlighting long-standing disagreements between Europe and the United States over when and how to utilize the security tools in their collective toolbox. One can almost hear echoes of the old adage, “the more things change, the more they stay the same.”

Despite the images of the Taliban fleeing Kabul and other towns around Afghanistan, skepticism continues to mount in European capitals as academics, journalists, policymakers, and the public ask whether a bombing campaign coupled with food drops is the best method to prevent future terrorist attacks. For some in Europe, the current U.S. strategy represents the quintessential American “our way or the highway” approach to conflict: unilateral, heavy military operations designed to avoid casualties with a wobbly strategy on what comes next. And for many in the United States, European reactions to the bombing campaign (such as calls to revitalize the UN and focus on the root causes of terrorism) represent typical European preferences for slow-moving, treaty-based organizations and strategies that cannot be carried out by European force structures.

What is particularly interesting in the current debate, though, is that no organization or “tool” is particularly well-suited for the task at hand. Neither Germany’s trusty pillars of multilateralism, integration, and engagement nor the various military instruments that America prefers (missile defense, NATO, or B-52 bombers) hold great promise for preventing another act of terrorism. Instead, new tools focusing on police coordination, intelligence gathering, and a number of judiciary and financial issues will need to be developed.

### **American Assumptions and Expectations**

European policymakers weren’t the only ones formulating wish lists of transatlantic policy changes after September 11<sup>th</sup>. American policymakers also anticipated shifts in foreign policy on the other side of the Atlantic. For example, the United States assumed that September 11<sup>th</sup> would bring a new sense of urgency to EU plans to expand and modernize European defense capabilities under the European Security and Defense Policy.

There have been two encouraging developments in recent weeks, indicating that ESDP is indeed a few steps closer to making the move from concept to reality. First, Turkey reportedly decided in early December to drop its objections to sharing NATO planning facilities with EU allies, ending months of gridlock. If all goes according to plan, cooperation between Turkey, NATO, and the EU can now move forward.

Second, European Union defense ministers met in November to firm up plans to build their joint rapid-reaction force whose development so far has been hindered by a number of logistical hurdles. Javier Solana, the EU’s high representative for CFSP, urged the ministers to act quickly. “The new strategic situation in the world means that we should move more rapidly,” he said.<sup>3</sup> Despite spelling out their countries’ contributions and pledging to tackle problem areas such as intelligence gathering and transport, though, the defense ministers made no promises to increase defense spending – a move that would enable them to acquire much needed strategic air and sea lift capabilities. EU leaders, such as Germany’s Chancellor Schroeder, might claim that they are “ready to make Europe

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<sup>3</sup> Shishkin, Philip. “EU Defense Ministers Commit Resources to Planned Joint Rapid-Reaction Force.” *Wall Street Journal*. November 20, 2001.

into an international player with global influence,” but as was the case before September 11<sup>th</sup>, the greatest obstacle to ESDP remains the lack of means to act.

If U.S. military planners have been disappointed with developments (or lack thereof) in the defense arena, the mood has been somewhat more positive over at the State Department, where officials have welcomed a number of speedy developments coming out of the EU. Within days of the terrorist attacks, the EU introduced new measures to fight terrorism across Europe, including “an agreed definition of what constitutes a terrorist act; a European arrest warrant to supplant the cumbersome system of extradition between member states; tighter money laundering rules; and a legislative vehicle to permit the rapid freezing of assets across Europe as soon as an individual or organization has been identified as a potential source of terrorist financing.”<sup>4</sup> The EU is also providing humanitarian support in and around Afghanistan. These actions, which have been much better, broader, and more coordinated than EU reactions to crises during the 1990s, have not gone unnoticed by American policymakers.

While September 11<sup>th</sup> has given the EU an opportunity to chip away at its image of a bureaucratic giant, it has also highlighted the fact that national capitals remain the key players in foreign affairs. When Prime Minister Blair decided to invite a few European leaders to a small dinner to discuss the war in Afghanistan he did not invite Solana or Patten. He invited the leaders of France and Germany. The coalition against terrorism, after all, was formed in national capitals not in institutions like the EU (or even NATO). To Blair’s surprise, though, his guest list, triggered a number of irate phone calls from smaller EU states such as Italy, Denmark, and Belgium who were not invited. They demanded to be included, complaining that the big powers of Europe would discuss and shape EU policy without them. Blair then extended some last minute invitations but the remaining eight outsiders were left fuming. The experience represents a microcosm of the EU’s tangled web of decision making, one the United States would certainly like to see straightened out. The hope is that the EU will muster enough political will to use this moment in history as cause for developing a better *modus operandi*. Otherwise, EU enlargement stands to sew at least another 10 threads into the already knotted EU stitching.

In addition to creating a wish list for changes inside the EU, the United States has been making some assumptions about policy shifts in individual EU member states since September 11<sup>th</sup>. Germany is one such example. While the U.S. policymakers were surely hopeful that September 11<sup>th</sup> would strengthen Germany’s leadership role in world affairs, no one, perhaps least of all the Germans themselves, anticipated the dramatic turn of events in the weeks following the attacks.

In mid-October, Chancellor Schroeder told members of the Bundestag “that the era of German post-war policy has irrevocably passed.”<sup>5</sup> Weeks later, he turned those words into action by announcing that Berlin was prepared to commit 3,900 troops to the war on terrorism, a qualitative leap in German readiness to take on military responsibilities in world affairs. But drumming up support for this newfound self-confidence in German foreign policy proved to be considerably difficult, particularly within Schroeder’s own coalition. The Chancellor chose to combine the decision to send troops with a confidence vote, calling the bluff of some Red and Green

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<sup>4</sup> Patten, Chris. “Look Again: The European Commission Has Been at Work.” International Herald Tribune. November 13, 2001.

<sup>5</sup> [http://www.bundesregierung.de/top/dokument/Regierung/Bundeskanzler/ix420\\_.htm](http://www.bundesregierung.de/top/dokument/Regierung/Bundeskanzler/ix420_.htm)

Parliamentarians. Schroeder narrowly won the vote but that victory does not guarantee that the Greens will fall in step with future Schroeder initiatives concerning the fight against terrorism.<sup>6</sup>

Moreover, Schroeder's victory in the Bundestag, perhaps to the dismay of U.S. military planners, should not be viewed as a signal that Germany is ready to put all of its proverbial eggs in the military basket. Germany's move to commit troops coupled with a number of statements from Foreign Minister Fischer ("Civilian means alone are unfortunately not always enough to put an end to violence and terror.") certainly show a Germany that is becoming more comfortable with using its own military means. But Schroeder and Fischer have been careful to frame recent developments within European parameters, paying homage to the Red/Green government's policy of continuity. Germany also remains skeptical that modern technology can provide all the answers to this new threat. In other words, Germans are unlikely to read headlines resembling the one that appeared in the *New York Times* on November 18<sup>th</sup>: "Surprise. War works after all."

## Conclusion

As it becomes more and more apparent that Europe and the United States are formulating different (and sometimes conflicting) sets of assumptions and conclusions from the events of September 11<sup>th</sup>, anxiety and friction are sure to remain a part of EU-U.S. relations. America's first instinct might be to go it alone. Europe might feel compelled to walk away. The transatlantic partners must resist these dangerous urges, though. A long list of future challenges loom on the horizon - challenges that will be far more trying than those the relationship currently faces.

- **Next steps in the war against terrorism.** Agreeing to go after Usama Bin Laden and various al Qaeda networks in Afghanistan wasn't all that tough for the transatlantic partnership. However, deciding where to go next and what tools to use won't be as easy. With the United States sending more and more signals that Iraq might be next, it isn't hard to imagine the current coalition crumbling. The United States could certainly go it alone from a technical standpoint. But are the advantages of unilateral action worth more than having friends who are particularly helpful in shutting off terrorist finances, sharing intelligence, and making international arrests? Furthermore, what does the United States mean when it states that it will begin targeting various "sleeper cells?" Europe will expect consultation on how, when, and where that might occur.
- **The issue of extradition.** Some European countries such as Spain have already arrested a number of Islamic militants allegedly tied to the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks. The key question here is – what will Europe do if the United States requests extraditions? In accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights, members of the European Union cannot extradite to a country where the death penalty is implemented. Many EU member states also oppose extradition to the military tribunals that President Bush plans to use to try terrorists. Right now, the debate is limited to theoretical arguments, but this smoldering issue could easily ignite sizable rifts in the transatlantic relationship if the United States decides to request extraditions.

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<sup>6</sup> The bill that approved 3,900 German troops for support roles in the fight against terrorism stipulates that German troops will not be used outside of Afghanistan.

- **The future of NATO.** NATO invoking Article V just days after the attacks was an impressive and very symbolic achievement in the history of the transatlantic relationship. And the fact that NATO AWACS are now patrolling U.S. skies has added a new degree of depth and commitment to the transatlantic relationship that has never before been witnessed. These milestones, however, fail to conceal serious questions concerning NATO's future. Will NATO take on a more political role in the coming years? Is it destined to become another OSCE? How will Russia's new relations with the West play out in NATO? And how will NATO enlargement enhance or diminish NATO's role in the fight against terrorism?
- **Developing a stable government in Afghanistan.** Adding more commotion to the already clamoring debate over the future government of Afghanistan, Europe and the United States continue to debate the best way to move ahead. Europe would like to give the UN the responsibility of the immediate recovery process until a proper government can stand on its own. But this is an option that many in Washington instinctively reject, for reasons ranging from a long-standing distrust of the United Nations to skepticism about its ability to deliver. Will Europe and the United States find a way out of this debate so they can focus their energy on getting the various factions to agree on a single plan of action? Furthermore, will they agree on the issue of including ex-Taliban leaders in the new government?
- **Pre-September 11<sup>th</sup> challenges.** Unfortunately, the terrorist attacks on September 11<sup>th</sup> did not erase any of the challenges that the transatlantic relationship faced on September 10<sup>th</sup>. These include regional conflicts such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (which continues to burn) and global challenges such as organized crime, North-South issues, global warming, AIDS in Africa, and immigration issues.

This is an overwhelming list and unfortunately, roadmaps for future directions in transatlantic relations aren't available. The best place for the transatlantic partners to begin, though, is together. It will not be easy. Tackling these challenges will require cooperation and consultation unlike any the two sides of the Atlantic have ever witnessed. Europe and the United States will need to find ways to move beyond age-old stereotypes and paradigms. They will need to exhibit degrees of flexibility and understanding that they didn't know they had.

Assuming there is some truth to the old adage, "what's past is prologue," I invite you to revisit "New Accents in Transatlantic Relations." As was the case at the time of printing, Europe and the United States do not share the same threat assessments, which has a significant impact on when and how the two sides of the Atlantic utilize the security tools in their collective toolbox. While the following pages won't provide all the answers on how to resolve those differences, they may very well provide some clues on tackling the many new challenges that lie ahead.

## **New Accents in Transatlantic Relations**

Julianne Smith

For over fifty years, German and American commitment and loyalty to the transatlantic relationship has been unswerving. Both sides of the Atlantic repeatedly herald the relationship as the cornerstone of their foreign policies, often reminding outsiders that “democratic Europe and North America are bound together as no other two regions in the world.”<sup>1</sup>

The eve of the new millennium, however, brought a series of transitions and changes that forced both sides of the Atlantic to question not only the future of the transatlantic relationship but also, and perhaps more importantly, the tools and strategies on which that relationship was based. During a period of a little more than a year, from late 1998 to the fall of 1999, a red-green coalition came to power in Germany, three major summits were held (all aimed at creating new security architectures for the 21<sup>st</sup> century), NATO conducted its first war, and the conflicts in East Timor and Chechnya boiled over. Like a series of obstacles, each of these events served as a test of the strength of the transatlantic relationship.

For some, the appointment of a member of the Green Party, Joschka Fischer, as Foreign Minister in 1998 served as the first signal of a German departure from the transatlantic relationship. The U.S. and other allies worried that Fischer’s green roots (traditionally classified as pacifist and anti-American) would damage the military-centric and American-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization at a time when many felt that NATO solidarity was the key to halting Milosevic’s regime. With the exception of a short-lived request for a review of NATO nuclear doctrine (which was quickly met with sharp protests from the U.S., the UK and France), however, Fischer managed to calm allied fears by repeatedly stressing a policy of continuity, one that placed transatlantic relations at its core. Germany’s decision to partake in the NATO bombing campaign over Kosovo only confirmed that there would indeed be no new Sonderweg.

When it became clear that it was going to take more than a few days of bombing to weaken Milosevic’s resolve, the press started asking NATO if its solidarity could hold indefinitely, alluding to the rumor that transatlantic relations were suffering. Not just Germany but other NATO members such as Greece and Italy were expressing uneasiness with a lengthy and costly bombing campaign. NATO Headquarters responded to the press with a steady stream of self-congratulatory rhetoric. During the April NATO Summit in Washington, NATO and non-NATO members such as Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and Macedonia were praised for their solidarity and commitment to protecting human rights in the Balkans. In what sometimes appeared to be an effort to convince themselves, NATO officials stated that Milosevic was not going to split the alliance or damage transatlantic relations. Instead, the war in Kosovo would serve as an example of the strength of the transatlantic partnership and its determination to see Western values triumph over a dictator whose policies clearly had no place in Europe. At an address to the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Javier Solana, Secretary General of NATO, explained how he hoped that, in addition to

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<sup>1</sup> Remarks by U.S. Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, to an audience at Wilton Park, England on January 20, 2000.

bringing peace and stability to the Balkans, bringing an end to the Kosovo conflict would strengthen transatlantic ties.

“If our transatlantic community can master the Kosovo challenge we will have demonstrated that in our community values have meaning. But more than that. If we can defuse the Balkan powder keg for good, we will have removed a major obstacle that prevents us from devoting our full attention to the key issue: building the Atlantic community of the 21st century. A community with a new, re-balanced transatlantic relationship. A community in which Russia plays its rightful role. A community that has the political and the military means to meet the challenges of the future.”<sup>2</sup>

The transatlantic community did overcome the “Kosovo challenge” by halting the massive human rights violations there and bringing the refugees home. However, Solana’s hopes for a re-balanced transatlantic relationship have yet to be realized. In fact, instead of drawing the two sides of the Atlantic closer together, Kosovo highlighted a number of differences in how the U.S. and Europe, particularly Germany, view the tools they have at their disposal (i.e., NATO, UN, OSCE). Unity and solidarity may have been the leitmotif as the bombs were falling over Kosovo, but when the smoke cleared, both sides walked away with two very different sets of conclusions.

Unfortunately, little time was available to process and understand such differences. Having “won” the war, NATO and its partners were immediately tasked with stabilizing and rebuilding Kosovo just months before the onset of another Balkan winter, renowned for being both early and particularly harsh. The transatlantic “to do” list became even lengthier with the creation of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, a conflict prevention program aimed at addressing democratization and human rights, economic reconstruction, and security issues in the entire Balkan region. Shortly thereafter, Chechnya re-ignited and East Timor turned violent, triggering a philosophical and international debate about the relationship between state sovereignty and human rights. Simultaneously, the 54 members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe were brought to Istanbul in November to define a new security architecture for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Described by some as a “policy earthquake,” that summit produced tremendous transatlantic disagreement over the OSCE’s response to Chechnya and the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Agreements were eventually reached, but by the end of 1999, the transatlantic stitching, having been pulled and tugged in so many directions, was beginning to fray.

### **Security Threats and Policy**

Because it had been based on fighting the common threat of the USSR for decades, the transatlantic partnership found itself in search of a new enemy at the end of the 1980s. With tensions rising in the Gulf, President Bush and his transatlantic allies named “aggression” as their common foe. Operation Desert Storm’s victory in the Gulf War, at least for a short while, provided some hope that perhaps the transatlantic community’s new task was indeed fighting aggression by broad definition. Rwanda,

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<sup>2</sup> <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1999/s990602a.htm>

Somalia, and Bosnia, however, put a quick end to those thoughts and left the transatlantic community virtually paralyzed. It became immediately clear that the transatlantic community was neither interested nor able to tackle most forms of aggression, especially those that were intrastate in nature.

By the time Kosovo started to regularly appear on the nightly news, both sides of the Atlantic had had a few years to process the lessons of the early and mid-1990s and agreed that this was one battle they should and could fight together. That, however, is where the similarities ended. German and American foreign policy goals as well as the threat assessments on which they were based no longer shared the similarities they once did. Both countries had drawn different sets of conclusions from the foreign policy challenges of the 1990s.

For the U.S., the early and mid 1990's provided the foundation for a new era of disarmament, which successfully resulted in several confidence and security building measures, enhanced non-proliferation regimes, and a reductions of nuclear arsenals on both sides of the Atlantic. But the same few years also confirmed the need to remain focused on heavy military threats such as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), chemical and biological weapons, long-range missile attacks from rogue states (or states of concern), and terrorist attacks such as those conducted against the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. Whether it is Secretary Madeleine Albright talking to the U.S. Senate or President Clinton speaking to the U.S. public, WMD and the missiles that can deliver them are routinely listed as the number one threat to America's security. Having followed a strong anti-terrorism agenda for several years, the U.S. is now convinced, more than ever, that terrorist attacks on its soil are imminent.

The 1990s also allowed the scope of U.S. foreign and security policy to widen. With the threat of a nuclear attack from the USSR gone and Europe relatively safe and sound, the United States was able to focus more of its attention on stability in Asia, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. Consequently, Germany and America's geopolitical embrace has relaxed, and as one U.S. State Department official put it, "Neither of us needs to be cuddled and hugged as much."

Germany's foreign policy changed in other ways during the 1990s due to a different set of lessons learned. Having reared its head in the Balkans, intrastate conflict became a very real and pressing threat for post-Cold War Europe, one that was particularly threatening for Germany. Due to both its liberal immigration laws and geographic location, Germany is a popular destination for refugees from Eastern and South Eastern Europe. Having taken in over 500,000 refugees during the crisis in Bosnia, population flows and uncontrolled migration are bona fide threats to Germany's security. As a result, stability in Russia, Eastern Europe, and the Balkans are top priorities of German foreign policy. WMD is also considered a threat to Germany's security, although it receives considerably less attention than it does in the United States. In fact, German State Minister, Ludger Volmer, and other German officials frequently remind international audiences that during the 1990s small weapons killed far more people (the majority, civilians) than Weapons of Mass Destruction.<sup>3</sup> That is why, for example, there has been no discussion of vaccinating

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<sup>3</sup> Ludger Volmer. "Internationale Solidarität und Eigeninteresse – deutsche UN-Politik an der Schwelle zum nächsten Jahrhundert." Vereinte Nationen. Ausgabe 02/99.

German soldiers against anthrax (as their U.S. counterparts are) and a great deal of discussion and promotion of the EU's Joint Action on its contribution to combating the accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons.

Placing the two lists of German and American perceived threats side by side, one would certainly find that they share many of the same items (instability in Russia, WMD, ethnic conflict, terrorism, corruption, drug trafficking, etc.). Where the two countries differ, however, is the way in which they perceive and prioritize those threats and then outline their foreign policy goals accordingly. In its New Security Strategy for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, the White House listed three core objectives of U.S. foreign policy: enhancing America's security, bolstering America's economic prosperity, and promoting democracy and human rights abroad.<sup>4</sup> The document then follows with a list of military tools the U.S. considers vital to achieve those objectives. In similar documents, Germany often lists promoting social justice, enhancing sustainability, and promoting human rights as its core objectives. Germany frequently stresses that strengthening the United Nations is the first step toward achieving those goals. Such differences, some would argue, have always existed. But the disappearance of the Soviet threat and the lessons both sides of the Atlantic drew from the 1990s as well as Fischer's own convictions have highlighted those differences and created a number of thorny disagreements over when and how to utilize the security tools in their collective toolbox.

### **The Security Toolbox**

#### *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)*

Of all the security instruments that the transatlantic community shares, none are as prized as NATO. A product of the Cold War, NATO is heralded as the most successful military alliance in history even though it "won" the dyadic battle against communism in Eastern Europe without ever engaging in active combat. With the Soviet threat gone, though, the defensive alliance decided to use the 1990s to redefine itself. It conducted its first NATO peacekeeping mission beyond its territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina, enlarged to include three new members, signed historic agreements with Russia and Ukraine, deepened partnerships with 25 Central European and Central Asian countries, instigated internal reform, and, conducted a 78-day air campaign to stop the human suffering in Kosovo.<sup>5</sup> Despite this impressive list, many questions concerning NATO's *raison d'être* remained unanswered as the alliance prepared for its 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary Summit in the spring of 1999. Were the NATO air strikes against the FRY an example of future out-of-area missions for the alliance? When should NATO use force? What type of capabilities will NATO require in the future? And finally, should NATO's nuclear doctrine be reexamined? Posing such questions to German and American policy makers produced and continues to produce distinct differences of opinion.

#### *Outlining NATO's Raison d'Etre*

NATO committed itself to creating a new Strategic Concept for its 1999 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary Summit in Washington, a task that opened the debate on the future of NATO. Even before NATO began its operation in Kosovo, considerable disagreement broke out between the allies over non-Article 5 crisis response

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/2000/1/7/1.text.1>

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1999/9904-01.htm>

operations (a.k.a. out-of-area operations not defensive in nature). The United States suggested that NATO undertake operations in support of Alliance “interests” outside of NATO territory on a case by case basis. Furthermore, the U.S. was opposed to limiting such missions to a specific geographic area. In a speech to the NATO Defense College on November 9, 1998, U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Alexander Vershbow, stated,

“Collective defense will remain the alliance’s fundamental task, but we hope that the 1999 edition [of the Strategic Concept] will make clear that NATO is not just about defending territory, but defending the common interests of its members. We think the alliance should be the ‘instrument of choice’ for defending those common interests, whenever there is a consensus to act.”

Germany, along with many of its European partners, felt uncomfortable with the U.S. “case by case” proposal and urged NATO to restrict its actions to the Euro-Atlantic area. Just days before the Summit, Fischer said that he had never “shared the view that NATO is suited for great power intervention.”<sup>6</sup> He added that portraying the alliance as omnipresent or omnipotent would be a mistake. While Fischer supported the NATO airstrikes against the FRY and was eager to exhibit a Red/Green policy of continuity, he clearly felt uncomfortable with any assumptions concerning future NATO interventions. He repeatedly reminded the German public that Kosovo was an “emergency situation that led to an emergency response” and that there were no other alternatives.<sup>7</sup> At the same time, however, he resisted any claims that the NATO intervention there signaled a new interventionist policy for either Germany or NATO.

The pre-Summit debate on intervention ended with a watered-down and vague sentence, the meaning of which was left to interpretation. In its new Strategic Concept NATO stated, “in the event of crises which jeopardize Euro-Atlantic stability and could affect the security of Alliance members, the Alliance’s military forces may be called upon to conduct crisis response operations.”<sup>8</sup> Whether or not such crises needed to fall in the Euro-Atlantic area to merit NATO action was never clarified.

Disagreements also surfaced over references in the new strategic concept to the UN Charter. Such disagreements became particularly turbulent after NATO decided to conduct the air campaign without a UN mandate. While the alliance had collectively made the decision to forego the UN mandate, a number of NATO members found it difficult to stomach the decision. International law experts warned that NATO’s failure to seek a UN mandate would ultimately weaken the UN and open a Pandora’s Box of dangerous precedents.<sup>9</sup> Joschka Fischer, a strong and long-standing supporter of the United Nations, and other foreign ministers from France, Belgium, Denmark, and Norway adamantly cautioned the alliance against categorizing NATO’s action over Kosovo as a precedent. The U.S., however, wanted to avoid situations in the future where NATO would essentially be held hostage by Russian and Chinese vetoes

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<sup>6</sup> “Milosevic wird der Verlierer sein” Der Spiegel. 17 April 1999, p. 35.

<sup>7</sup> König, Jens and Schwarz, Patrik Schwarz. “Ich fühle mich nicht als Sieger des Krieges” Die Tageszeitung, 19 July 1999, p. 2-3.

<sup>8</sup> <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>

<sup>9</sup> Some experts, for example, believed that other countries, particularly rogue states, would be inclined to use NATO’s actions in Kosovo as justification for their own interventions in the future. Months later, this actually became the case when Russia argued that NATO members had no right to criticize its actions in Chechnya due to NATO’s failure to heed to Russian objections concerning Kosovo.

in the UN Security Council.<sup>10</sup> Again, a compromise was reached by reaffirming that “The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and, as such, plays a crucial role in contributing to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.”<sup>11</sup>

The most dramatic pre-Summit debate was in reference to NATO’s nuclear doctrine. In the fall of 1998, shortly after he arrived in office, Joschka Fischer put forward the idea that NATO adopt a no first use policy for nuclear weapons. The United States, France, Britain adamantly opposed such a change and attempted to prevent even debate on the issue. However, other countries, particularly Canada, soon joined Germany in calling for a debate on NATO’s nuclear policies. In its final version, over strong U.S. opposition, the Concept’s description of the circumstances in which NATO would use nuclear weapons was slightly changed. It now reads that the circumstances in which NATO might have to consider using nuclear weapons are “extremely remote.” Yet nuclear weapons are still considered the “supreme guarantee” of Alliance security, and still fulfill an “essential role”. Because these changes were so modest, Germany demanded and got agreement to a study on nuclear policy. This study was also to include the development by NATO of a new process for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, to replace the concept dating from 1989. Proposals for this study were to be laid out in December 1999. Instead, NATO focused most on what the timetable and product of the review should look like and which NATO committee should coordinate.<sup>12</sup> Since then, a number of nuclear-weapon members of the Alliance have brushed off the original German proposal, calling it a mere concession to the Green Party, one Fischer himself knew wouldn’t “go anywhere.” Senior German officials, however, (with their Dutch and Canadian counterparts) claim that “we haven’t seen the end of this debate.”

Roughly ten days before the Summit, Germany pitched NATO another curve ball with a six point peace plan for Kosovo. The plan called for a 24-hour bombing pause to coincide with the simultaneous withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo. It also named the UN as the authorizing and administrating institution, called for a special summit of the G8 (the usual G7 group plus Russia), and suggested an “international force” in lieu of a NATO-led force to replace Serb troops in Kosovo. The U.S. and Britain initially cried foul, claiming the plan was not in full accordance with NATO conditions for a halt to the bombing. Russia, having adopted a stern anti-NATO stance during the NATO airstrikes, expressed a strong interest in the plan because it incorporated two bodies in which Russia was included – the G8 and the UN. Yeltsin’s special envoy on Yugoslavia, Viktor Chernomyrdin, welcomed what he called a “peaceful way out of the crisis,” signaling a softening of Moscow’s position, something the NATO allies knew was critical to brokering an accord with Milosevic.<sup>13</sup> Weeks later, after the plan was tweaked, Chernomyrdin and Finnish President Ahtisaari flew to Belgrade and returned with a peace agreement signed by Milosevic. Germany certainly wasn’t in a position to take all the credit, but many

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<sup>10</sup> The U.S. failure to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, its refusal to sign onto the Land Mine Ban Treaty and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, its delay in paying its UN dues, and its plans to renounce the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in the summer of 2000 all provide evidence of the U.S.’s at best, ambivalent, at worst weak, support of international organizations and treaties.

<sup>11</sup> <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>

<sup>12</sup> Butler, Nicola. “NATO Ministers Fudge The Essentials,” Disarmament Diplomacy. Issue No 42, Acronym Institute, London. Dec. 1999

<sup>13</sup> “Russia Hints At Softening Of Position On Balkans” The Scotsman. 16 Apr. 1999

inside and outside of NATO agreed that the German government did more than any other member of the Alliance to reach a political solution.

The real surprise with Germany's role in the Kosovo conflict, therefore, did not come with its participation in the NATO airstrikes and KFOR. While the conflict in Kosovo indeed resulted in the first combat deployment of German soldiers on foreign soil in postwar history, this development was part of an evolution that had begun years earlier.<sup>14</sup> More astonishing for Germany's allies was the leadership that Schroeder and Fischer exhibited in locking Russia, the EU, NATO, and the UN hand in hand toward the end of the conflict. The U.S. and other NATO members, albeit somewhat reluctantly, began to view Germany as a serious partner in solving complex problems. Of course, as the pre-Summit debates over the future of NATO showed, this rebalancing of German/American relations also meant that the new German government would not hesitate to question U.S. leadership or put forth controversial proposals. For better or worse, Joschka Fischer would no longer be referred to as the reluctant statesman.

#### *Post-Kosovo NATO Debates*

Even after the ink dried on the NATO Summit documents and the smoke cleared in Kosovo, disagreements over the future of NATO continued and, in some cases, worsened. Fischer, who had struggled to keep his party behind him during the NATO airstrikes, started calling for the creation of a "culture of prevention," a term actually coined by the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan. Fischer's speeches and interviews became studded with the term, even though it was not always clear how he proposed to achieve this aim. What was clear, however, was Fischer's conviction that NATO was not Germany's instrument of choice for addressing intra-state conflict. For historical reasons, Germany has never given priority to the military instrument, but Fischer's post-Kosovo rhetoric placed increased emphasis on non-military instruments even after NATO's "victory" over Milosevic. He spoke, for example, of using the UN to bridge the gap between early warning and early response the next time a conflict like Kosovo stumbled onto the world stage.

The U.S., not surprisingly, took a different post-Kosovo view. Secretary Albright, calling NATO a tool of global power projection, stated that U.S. priorities for the year 2000 included "an even stronger NATO, bolstered by new members, developing new capabilities, and prepared for new missions."<sup>15</sup> And according to the U.S., the key to creating a stronger NATO was enhanced capabilities. For the past 10 years, the U.S. has been calling for European countries to acquire high-tech military equipment to fill the interoperability and technology gaps that are hindering greater European burdensharing in security operations. The crisis in Kosovo only increased the intensity of such cries. Just weeks after the airstrikes ceased, NATO Supreme Allied Commander General Clark, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, and various senior level U.S. policy makers presented their lists of lessons learned. Time and time again, the Europeans were chided for their poor military performance. U.S. Deputy

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<sup>14</sup> Germany deployed a small medical team in Cambodia in 1992 and a larger contingent in Somalia in 1993. In the mid-1990's Germany participated in UN and NATO-led efforts to cool ex-Yugoslavia. Finally, in 1994, Germany's constitutional court ruled that German armed forces were not restricted to territorial defense but could also participate in other types of international military operations.

<sup>15</sup> In a speech to the School of Advanced International Studies at John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University, Washington, DC on January 18, 2000.

Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, said that NATO's top priority should be "getting ESDI<sup>16</sup> and DCI<sup>17</sup> right."<sup>18</sup> What this meant was that European NATO members would need to increase defense spending and work on making their forces more mobile, flexible, and capable of operating effectively together. There was little or no mention of the UN, conflict prevention, or enhanced non-military instruments.

During the second half of 1999 and into 2000, Germany and other European countries rode a policy roller coaster, often calling DCI "a major step in the right direction" while simultaneously claiming that the money needed to fill the technological gaps simply wasn't available.<sup>19</sup> Germany, the NATO member that spends the lowest percentage of GDP on defense after Luxembourg (1.5%), has been the first to admit that its armed forces, structured to meet a threat from the east, are outdated and need restructuring.<sup>20</sup> Several factors, however, have prevented the country from making significant strides forward in this regard. First, the Ministry of Defense set up a Commission on the "Common Security and Future of the Bundeswehr."<sup>21</sup> Any changes in the Bundeswehr either financially or structurally were postponed until the Commission released its final recommendations in May of 2000. (The future of conscription was one of the key points the Commission would examine.) Second, the Red/Green government committed itself to a multi-year austerity program, which renders an increase in defense expenditures highly unlikely. Secretary of Defense, Rudolf Scharping, is therefore, left with only one option: a more efficient use of available resources. U.S. policy makers remind Germany, however, that greater efficiency won't be enough and, in some cases, may be more challenging than increasing defense spending. Speaking to reporters on his way to the Munich Conference on Security Policy, which was held in early February, U.S. Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, said, "Efficiencies may be as hard to come by as raising money."

A solution to this disagreement has not yet been found, although Fischer has stated that German defense spending will eventually be increased. The U.S. continues to grow frustrated with the nodding heads of agreement that fail to produce signs of change. Europeans are tired of U.S. accusations that they are relying "upon the U.S. to carry the heavy load."<sup>22</sup> Some European security analysts, like Stephan De Spiegeleire, argue that Europe doesn't get enough credit for its contributions to international security. "Europe's understanding of and contribution to international and regional security transcends the simple criterion of defense expenditure. When one adds Europe's relative contributions to multinational military activities as well as

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<sup>16</sup> European Security and Defense Identity: a concept whereby European nations would develop a capability to independently conduct peace-support missions within the framework of the Petersberg tasks (humanitarian operations, peacekeeping and other crisis-management tasks as outlined in the WEU Petersberg Declaration in Bonn, 19 July 1992.)

<sup>17</sup> Defense Capabilities Initiative, defined by the U.S. Information Agency as a concept "aimed at ensuring the effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full spectrum of NATO missions in the present and foreseeable security environment with a special focus on improving interoperability among Alliance forces (and where applicable also between Alliance and Partner forces)."

<sup>18</sup> <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1999/s991215c.htm>

<sup>19</sup> <http://www.bundeswehr.de/reden/bm000111.html>

<sup>20</sup> "A Bigger German Say – But Fewer Guns?" *The Economist*. 18 September 1999, p. 36.

<sup>21</sup> <http://www.bundeswehr.de/reden/bm000111.html>

<sup>22</sup> "Allies' Defense Role Challenged." *The Washington Post*, 9 February 2000, p. 5.

its foreign aid - both of which greatly exceed those of the U.S. - the overall picture looks much more favorable to Europe."<sup>23</sup>

Without doubt, both sides of the Atlantic agree that there have been changes in the strategic environment in which NATO operates and the requirements of a modern security policy. As the NATO Summit and the post-Kosovo debates, however, have shown, agreeing on what those requirements should look like has been much more difficult. With Cohen primarily talking about military requirements for the 21<sup>st</sup> century and Scharping claiming, "It would be inappropriate to maintain a pure military understanding of peace and freedom, security and stability," disagreements regarding the NATO tool are likely to continue for quite some time.<sup>24</sup>

#### *The United Nations (UN)*

NATO isn't the only security instrument that has been drilling a few holes in the transatlantic relationship. Debates over NATO's future role in international security as well as a host of other transatlantic security debates are in fact rooted in differences in how the two sides of the Atlantic view their *collective* toolbox. For a country like Germany that places such high value on multilateralism and conflict prevention, the UN is the first tool it prefers to reach for when some corner of the world needs repair. The U.S., on the other hand, likes to remind Europeans that multilateralism need not equal UN-ism.<sup>25</sup> A firm believer in multilateralism but hardened by the realities of its military, political, and military might, the U.S. clearly prefers NATO. And in some cases, it disregards the toolbox altogether, favoring a unilateralist approach.<sup>26</sup> While such fundamental differences are not new, the lessons that the U.S. and Germany drew from events in the late 1990s as well as Fischer's personal convictions have highlighted significant differences of opinion regarding the future of the UN.

Since Kosovo, Fischer's support for the UN has heightened as he has outlined his vision for the UN in the future, a vision that is increasingly at odds with that of the U.S. In a number of post-Kosovo interviews, Fischer has asserted that the NATO airstrikes strengthened, not weakened the UN, as so many claim.<sup>27</sup> He believes that NATO's decision to forego a UN mandate made UN reform imminent, that the UN must now readjust the balance between state sovereignty and the protection of human rights. Germany hopes, according to Fischer, that such reform will lead to an enhanced role for the organization whereby the UN would serve as the basis for a multilateral oriented policy of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.<sup>28</sup> And Fischer hasn't been alone in such cries. Schroeder and Scharping have also made strong calls for UN reform. Scharping, in an address to the NATO Defense College in Rome, dedicated part of his presentation to the UN, reminding the audience that "the UN needs effective mechanisms and greater capabilities for peacekeeping."<sup>29</sup> He highlighted detailed

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<sup>23</sup> De Spiegeleire, Stephan. "From Mutually Assured Debilitation to Flexible Response: A New Menu of Options for European Crisis Management," WEU at Fifty, The Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, Paris. 1998. p. 20.

<sup>24</sup> <http://www.bundeswehr.de/reden/bm000111.html>

<sup>25</sup> Haas, Richard, ed. *Transatlantic Tensions. The United States, Europe, and Problem Countries*. Brookings Institution Press. Washington, D.C. 1999, p. 236.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid*, p. 228.

<sup>27</sup> <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/nf/0,1518,27850,00.html>

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>29</sup> "Euro-Atlantic Security and Regional Stability in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century," a speech of the German Minister of Defense, Rudolf Scharping, at the NATO Defense College in Rome on 11 January 2000.

proposals such as his own decision to earmark stand-by military capabilities for the UN so as to improve the organization's response capability and a German proposal to require the permanent members of the UN Security Council to provide an explanation whenever they exercise their right of veto.

The U.S. has also been a strong advocate of UN reform albeit of a different form. Up until very recently, the U.S. Congress has been withholding funds since the early 1980s for UN programs and activities of which it did not approve, but also to pressure the UN to reform many of its *internal* practices.<sup>30</sup> This is where the key difference lies, though. While Germany expresses clear visions of a UN with enhanced capabilities and increased response time, the U.S. limits its calls for reform mainly to administrative and management issues. Such differences became glaringly obvious during the opening of the 54<sup>th</sup> session of the UN General Assembly. President Clinton began by offering three resolutions for the new millennium: to wage an unrelenting battle against poverty, to strengthen the capacity of the international community to prevent and, whenever possible, to stop outbreaks of mass killing, and to prevent the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction. He stressed *shared responsibility*, citing, for example, the responsibility the West African nations accepted when they acted to restore peace in Sierra Leone. He also added a dose of realpolitik when he said, "We cannot do everything everywhere."<sup>31</sup> And almost as if he were reflecting on post-Kosovo statements he made concerning humanitarian intervention, statements that later came back to haunt him during Chechnya and East Timor, Clinton warned that "promising too much can be as cruel as caring too little."<sup>32</sup>

Unlike Clinton's presentation, which surprisingly never actually mentioned the word reform, Fischer's address was heavily peppered with specific suggestions for UN reform. He opened by claiming that NATO's actions in Kosovo "must not set a precedent for weakening the UN Security Council's monopoly on authorizing the use of legal international force."<sup>33</sup> He said that the Security Council "must have a more representative composition and, above all, it must be equipped to react to the crises and conflicts of today."<sup>34</sup> Fischer also tackled the thorny issues of permanent members' right of veto, the role of regional organizations, the use of peacekeeping missions before conflicts erupt (such as in Macedonia), global nuclear disarmament, the illegal transfer of small arms, the International Criminal Court, and the death penalty. He called for conventions, public debates, resolutions, and the development of a Millennium Vaccine Fund. In closing, he stated that "the UN must become the core of effective global governance" as "our world will always be plural and no form of unilateralism can therefore work in the long run."<sup>35</sup>

Roughly two years into Fischer's term as Foreign Minister, it is not yet clear how far he is willing to push many of the UN issues that he and other German policy makers have promised to take on. So far, Fischer's rhetoric has only raised a few eyebrows in

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<sup>30</sup> <http://www.clw.org/ecun/9-22-99.html>

<sup>31</sup> [http://www.state.gov/www/issues/990921\\_clinton\\_unga.html](http://www.state.gov/www/issues/990921_clinton_unga.html)

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Address by Joschka Fischer, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, at the Fifty-fourth Session of the United Nations General Assembly New York, September 22, 1999.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

Washington. But if Fischer is intent on turning his rhetoric into practice, tension with the U.S. will rise considerably, particularly if he advocates an evaluation of sanctions, the death penalty, or the right to veto, three issues that the U.S. has little or no interest in discussing.

*The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)*

In comparison to NATO or the UN, the potential for disagreement between the U.S. and Germany concerning the OSCE is less apparent. In fact, on the surface, transatlantic consensus regarding this security instrument is vast. Both countries have repeatedly heralded the OSCE's promotion of democratic societies, free elections, the rule of law, tolerance of minorities, freedom of speech, and freedom of economic decision-making as a vital contribution to conflict prevention.

Even after the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) was pulled out of Kosovo, both countries continued to praise the OSCE while agreeing that its capabilities would need to be strengthened. Although the mission did experience some initial success, the slow manner in which the OSCE made personnel available for the mission meant that a full three months after the second UN Security Council resolution in 1999, only 600 monitors had been deployed from the 2000 originally envisioned.<sup>36</sup> All members of the OSCE recognized that future verifiers or civilian observers would have to be better trained, more swiftly deployed and better supported by participating governments. Therefore, at its summit in Istanbul in the fall of 1999, the OSCE committed itself to building a rapid response capability. The concept, first proposed by the U.S., is officially called REACT (Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams). It aims to provide the OSCE with an on-call capability that would allow the organization to rapidly send in teams of trained experts to address conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation situations in OSCE participating states.

What the Summit failed to clarify, however, was how REACT would differ from similar rapid reaction capabilities that the EU intends to create or that other organizations have already created. Next time the Euro-Atlantic region is intent on putting its crisis management tools to work, will it turn to the OSCE, the UN, NATO, or the EU? Answering that question is likely to produce some noticeable rifts in the transatlantic relationship. Definitions of conflict management vary, leading to different conclusions on which organization is best suited for the task. And the institutions themselves provide little clarity as the EU, OSCE, UN and NATO all assert that crisis management is one of their primary aims. For now, no one seems particularly bothered by the overlap. But tackling the issue of funding could create future divides in the transatlantic relationship. Some countries may decide, for example, to invest in the EU's capabilities over those of the OSCE, a practice bound to upset U.S. attempts to move REACT forward.

Despite the unified round of applause that REACT received and indeed merited from virtually all OSCE members, the conflict in Chechnya created a considerable amount of transatlantic tension at the Summit. Just as in past debates concerning "rogue states," there was a sharp divide between Germans and Americans on how to respond

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<sup>36</sup> Seymour, Jack and Smith, Julianne. "The Challenges of Funding, Recruiting, and Training Personnel for OSCE Field Missions." British American Security Information Council. November 1999, p. 2.

to Russia's violation of international norms and resulting human rights abuses. The Germans, who often favor engagement over isolation, suggested that the OSCE "go easy" on the Russians over their violations of the new CFE<sup>37</sup> limits in the Caucasus, particularly Chechnya. The Americans, in favor of the "pressure cooker" approach, wanted, at the very least, a political statement from Yeltsin, during the Summit, stating that Russia intended to return as soon as possible to the Treaty limits and honor them in future. The Germans, warning that this approach would ultimately make Russia walk away from the Treaty, told the Americans that they were asking too much. Eventually, the U.S. won the Germans over (reluctantly), and the OSCE got the Russian statement. This debate, though, represents a long-standing difference of opinion concerning what Pierre Hassner once called carrots and sticks. ("The Americans believe in sticks, the Germans believe in carrots, the French," he goes on to say, "believe in words."<sup>38</sup>) Others, like Timothy Garton Ash, label it "megaphone diplomacy" vs. "quiet diplomacy."<sup>39</sup> Fischer, maintaining his policy of continuity, has shown that, like his predecessors, he too believes that berating countries for improper behavior can sometimes be counter-productive. And the U.S., maintaining its own policy of continuity, clearly disagrees.

The U.S. and Germany also differ on the degree of importance they attach to OSCE flexibility. The U.S. and a number of other OSCE members often express a "knee-jerk" wariness about creating a costly, cumbersome bureaucracy inside the OSCE. Therefore, the U.S. has rejected suggestions to significantly increase the OSCE budget or staff, with the exception of minor changes required to implement its innovative REACT proposal. Fischer, on the other hand, has openly called for increasing the OSCE budget and argues that "flexibility should not be valued over new changes that make sense."<sup>40</sup> The German government has also shown a determination to set a positive example for all OSCE members by committing itself to enhancing its own internal civilian prevention mechanisms. Since the fall of 1998, the Red/Green government has made good on a number of promises and priorities outlined in its negotiated coalition treaty. It has founded an OSCE study center in Hamburg, started a new civilian training program (aimed at providing the OSCE and the UN with better trained civilian personnel), made 20 million DM available for the founding of a peace research institute, and established a new "Zivile Friedensdienst" (civil peace service). Whereas conflict prevention was once an academic term that held little meaning for policy makers, Germany has recently increased its efforts to translate the term into viable policy options.

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<sup>37</sup> Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). In an effort to enhance military stability and security in Europe the CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna (1986-1989) endorsed a mandate for negotiations on the level of conventional armed forces in Europe. The negotiations were carried out within the framework of the CSCE among 23 participating States - those belonging to NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). They resulted in the legally binding agreement known as the CFE Treaty, signed in Paris on 19 November 1990.

<sup>38</sup> Ash, Timothy Garton. *In Europe's Name, Germany and the Divided Continent*. Vintage Books, A Division of Random House, Inc. New York. 1993, p.254.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.* p. 263.

<sup>40</sup> Address by Joschka Fischer, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, before the OSCE Ministerial Council Meeting on December 3, 1998 in Oslo, Norway.

### **Future Security Tools, Future Differences**

While both sides of the Atlantic spent a large part of 1999 disagreeing over the future and purpose of their collective toolbox, the fiercest transatlantic debates have occurred over two tools they don't share: ESDP<sup>41</sup> and national missile defense. And in the case of missile defense, heated exchanges are being traded over a tool that doesn't even exist yet. Nevertheless, disagreements over the development of a European Security and Defense Policy and a U.S. missile defense system have done more to pull apart the transatlantic stitching than any other issue in recent years.

#### *European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)*

Now that the EU has finally heeded U.S. calls for greater burdensharing and set upon the task of creating its own European Security and Defense Policy, the Americans are finding a bitter truth to the old adage, "you have to be careful what you wish for." It has become evident that a stronger European voice in security and defense will certainly challenge the U.S. leadership role in NATO. Such realizations, which have proven to be tough for many in the U.S. to swallow, have resulted in a flood of statements and warnings from U.S. policy makers, academics, and members of Congress regarding why and how ESDP will evolve. And the underlying theme in those statements and warnings has been - "Whatever you do, do not undermine NATO."

Transatlantic tensions first arose concerning the motivation for developing ESDP. American policy makers and members of Congress have repeatedly reminded the Europeans that the main purpose of ESDP should be "strengthening NATO's capacity to manage crises in the future and to provide a stronger European contribution to NATO operations."<sup>42</sup> Providing European members of NATO with an autonomous capacity for action is, according to the U.S., a secondary goal. Ironically, German and French officials outline the same reasoning for ESDP but in the reverse order. First, says Fischer, Europe needs to develop the capacity to act alone, particularly in response to conflicts that lie close to its borders. Secondly, Fischer and Scharping agree that Germany and other EU members of NATO need to use ESDP to improve their capacity to project military force in conjunction with NATO. But they firmly remind their U.S. counterparts that ESDP is an EU initiative, one that is being developed outside of NATO. This means that ESDP will not be subject to a NATO "right of first refusal," whereby the EU will only use its capabilities in cases where NATO declines to take action. As Thomas Valasek, of the Center for Defense Information, recently pointed out, "If the Europeans are to build a force fully capable of military operations in Europe, they will surely expect to be in charge of it."<sup>43</sup>

Recognizing its somewhat limited influence over the development of ESDP, the U.S. has called for the creation of a formal EU-NATO link. Despite working within miles of one another, EU and NATO officials rarely come together to discuss their respective strategies for managing transatlantic security. Now that ESDP has begun to move from concept to reality, it seems logical to break that tradition with a formal mechanism to breed transparency between the two organizations. U.S. Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, in a speech to NATO defense ministers asked that the EU and NATO deal with each other as equals and said that, "frequent contacts between

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<sup>41</sup> European Security and Defense Policy

<sup>42</sup> <http://www.nato.int/usa/ambassador/s991217a.htm>

<sup>43</sup> <http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/nato/Valasek021700.html>

the two organizations are imperative.”<sup>44</sup> European policy makers, theoretically supportive of these ideas, have cautioned against putting the cart before the horse and stated that closer cooperation with NATO will wait until ESDP is more advanced. This argument, justified or not, has only “exacerbated U.S. anxieties over decoupling” and triggered a series of tense exchanges between Washington and European capitals.<sup>45</sup> U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Alexander Vershbow, in a very poignant address at a European security conference in December of 1999 warned Europeans about retreating to their “ivory tower.”<sup>46</sup>

How to include non-EU allies such as Turkey, Norway and Poland in ESDP has also become a very tense topic of discussion. The U.S., worried that alienating Turkey will create dissent within NATO, has asked the EU to immediately address this “unfinished detail” by granting the six non-EU members of NATO a special status above and beyond what they currently enjoy.<sup>47</sup> For the EU, this issue seems less pressing. ESDP, after all, serves as a natural progression in the EU integration process, one that deepens, not widens the reach of the organization. For that reason, Turkey is a particularly sensitive issue, although the EU’s recent decision to eventually open the door of EU membership to Turkey should ease concerns about Turkish participation in ESDP.

In an attempt to create transparency and cool U.S. fears surrounding ESDP, armies of EU policy makers, spin doctors, and academics have descended on Washington in recent months. Most presentations begin with heavy emphasis on the value of the transatlantic partnership aimed at breeding trust and smoothing over American uneasiness associated with ESDP. But avoiding serious wear and tear on the transatlantic relationship is going to take more than non-stop praise for the ties that have bound Europe and North America for the past fifty years.

ESDP demands that both sides of the Atlantic take a long, hard look at the future of the partnership, particularly the question of leadership. Fischer appears to understand this. In February, he asked, “Instead of being so defensive about ESDP, shouldn’t we be using this chance to redefine the transatlantic partnership?”<sup>48</sup> The U.S., often uncomfortable with sharing leadership in the name of a true and healthy partnership and worried about upsetting the status quo, hesitates to answer that question affirmatively. But as one European security analyst puts it, “the traditional Atlantic bargain is already unraveling [and] the status quo is unsustainable.”<sup>49</sup>

#### *National Missile Defense (NMD)*

While Europe works on honing its ESDP tool, the U.S. is starting to develop plans for a new security tool of its own, National Missile Defense. And like ESDP, the transatlantic debate on NMD has produced some turbulent exchanges.

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<sup>44</sup> Jim Garamone. “U.S. Proposes ‘More Positive’ Visions of NATO-EU.” American Force Press Service, October 10, 2000.

<sup>45</sup> Charles A. Kupchan. “In Defense of European Defense: An American Perspective.” *Survival*, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, p. 19.

<sup>46</sup> <http://www.nato.int/usa/ambassador/s991217a.htm>

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>48</sup> Address by Joschka Fischer, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, before the Munich Security Conference on February 5, 2000 in Munich, Germany.

<sup>49</sup> Charles A. Kupchan. “In Defense of European Defense: An American Perspective.” *Survival*, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, p. 21.

While various U.S. academics, scientists, NGOs, and policy makers continue to debate the feasibility, costs, and implications of NMD, there appears to be widespread acceptance in the U.S. of the legitimacy of the threat NMD will counter. Thanks to a number of threat assessments produced by intelligence agencies and defense experts, many inside Washington are now convinced that an attack from a rogue state or non-state actors such as Osama bin Laden is imminent. As for the public, few have any interest in this highly technical debate. What resonates, however, is the need to protect American citizens from a threat that has become an article of faith. As a result, current NMD debates in the U.S. are much more concerned with when and how rather than why. As one security analyst put it, "This is where the rest of the world enters the debate."<sup>50</sup>

To be sure, Europeans acknowledge the threat stemming from the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and have stated that they have no interest in disputing America's right to develop what it believes is right for national defense. But policy makers in Berlin, London, and Paris, however, have also strongly encouraged the U.S. to "seek other ways of reducing the threats it perceives," a threat that some believe is nowhere near as great as the U.S. claims.<sup>51</sup> In fact, some Europeans find the idea of missiles landing on American shores to be altogether exaggerated.<sup>52</sup> Many American allies inside NATO have also reminded the U.S. that NATO's current strategic doctrine states that the threat from nuclear weapons is "extremely remote."

Threat assessments aside, Europeans also worry about the implications of NMD on the ABM Treaty, which they consider to be the cornerstone of international disarmament efforts. In fact, some Europeans have stated that the entire international arms control regime is at stake - a risk far more real to Europeans than the threats NMD will be designed to address. As Britain's three major political parties recently stated, "The question is whether the additional security that NMD might offer outweighs the negative impact of its deployment on strategic arms control."<sup>53</sup> For many Europeans, particularly the French and the Germans, the answer is no. German officials have also stressed the "political costs" associated with NMD such as the arms proliferation effect on countries such as India and China. Fueling anti-American sentiment in Russia is listed as another concern by European governments. For the most part, however, these cries have fallen on deaf ears. Europeans have been told that the question of deploying NMD isn't "whether but when."<sup>54</sup> The U.S., genuinely in fear of missile attacks from North Korea, Iran, or Iraq, views the decision as one it will have to take in the name of protecting its own national interests and made it clear that outsiders will have little influence on the process.

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<sup>50</sup> Denise Groves. "National Missile Defense Under Attack." BITS Policy Note 00.2, ISSN 1434-3274. June 2000.

<sup>51</sup> "Weapons of Mass Destruction." Eighth Report from Britain's House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. 2 August 2000.

<sup>52</sup> See "**Threat of 'Rogue'** States: Is It Reality or Rhetoric?" by Steven Mufson, Washington Post. May 29, 2000.

<sup>53</sup> "Weapons of Mass Destruction." Eighth Report from Britain's House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. 2 August 2000.

<sup>54</sup> Address by William Cohen, U.S. Secretary of Defense before the Munich Security Conference on February 5, 2000 in Munich, Germany.

Such a definitive response from the U.S. fuelled smoldering transatlantic tensions. Europeans view the ESDP and NMD debates as nothing more than a vicious game of double standards, with the U.S. intent on having a say in European security while rebuffing European input into American security. The U.S., though, feels that its security commitment to Europe, one that is not reciprocated by the Europeans to the United States, justifies its behavior. Either way, the NMD debate represents fundamental differences between Europeans and Americans over future threats to their security and the tools they believe those threats merit.

Fortunately, transatlantic tensions cooled when President Clinton decided to postpone the decision to deploy NMD in September 2000. For both technological and diplomatic reasons, the President conveyed to his successor the responsibility to decide whether to deploy a national missile-defense system. However, once the next U.S. Administration finishes unpacking its bags, the NMD debate will begin again, possibly triggering another heated exchange between Europe and the U.S. At that point or even before then, the EU might want to consider taking a common position on NMD. Politically challenging but not impossible, adopting a common position would add weight to European objections and concerns and heighten the EU's credibility on the issue of NMD. Otherwise, statements from European national governments will continue to be viewed as nothing more than political maneuvering full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.

### **Future Visions**

Germany and the U.S. no longer view international security through the same lenses. When the U.S. envisions the security environment of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, a hostile and threatening image comes to mind, requiring the build-up of fortress USA. Germany also envisions future hostilities but they are, in most cases, portrayed as less severe than missile attack scenarios. And in lieu of building up its military instrument, Germany has faith that its trusty pillars of multilateralism, integration, and engagement (combined with a heightened interest in prevention) will serve it well, perhaps even bringing more tangible results than the threat of force.

These different approaches to international security certainly do not mean that the transatlantic relationship is at risk of fading into the history books. Even if the two sides were interested in parting ways, their cultural and economic ties render that impossible. But, for better or worse, the relationship has changed. The challenge now rests with recognizing and accepting current transatlantic differences regarding threat assessments, national interests, public opinion, priorities, budgets, and security instruments.

As the next brewing conflict waits to arrive on the international stage and the debates over NMD and ESDP boil over, Germany and the U.S. must increase their flexibility, closely examine the needs of transatlantic security, identify their comparative advantages, address the question of leadership, and admit that, while the transatlantic relationship looks different than it did a mere ten years ago, it will and should remain a critical component of their foreign and security policies. Only so can a new dialogue begin.