INTERIM REPORT FROM THE BALI PREPCOMM
By Yuri Onodera, Friends of the Earth Japan
Below is an interim report about the negotiation of the WSSD Preparatory
Committee for WSSD which is being held in Bali, Indonesia from 27
May. I had to leave Bali before the end of the meeting, so this
report is a kind of a wrap up for the first week only, based on
the text version distributed on and information by Tuesday night,
4 June. Ministers were arriving, and the situation might have changed
during the high level segment (5-7.6). My apology for those working
on the areas I couldn't cover such as mining, biodiversity, forest,
ocean, debt, global public goods and so forth. Any error or misinformation
is solely of my responsibility and feel free to suggest correction
or add in any way. I rather tried to focus on overarching negotiating
issues. I also recommend to check Eco (esp. 3 June) for good analyses
with NGO views and goals.
The meeting is the last stop before the WSSD in Johannesburg in
August (though there is a rumor of having another in June in Brazil.)
Two so-called Type 1 documents are expected as the key outcomes
of this meeting: the Plan of Implementation/Action (Chairman's text)
and the elements of the Political Declaration. The Type 2 outcomes
of partnership initiatives are not covered in this memo. Paragraph
numbers in parentheses are taken from the 3pm, 2 June draft version
of the Plan of Implementation (incorporating the previous Vice-Chair's
text).
THE PROCESS
The negotiation has been focused on the revised Chair text, and
the progresses (or regresses) have been very slow. Frustrations
and disappointments among delegates and civil society participants
alike are pretty high. Contact Groups are formed on most contentious
areas such as institutional framework, finance, energy, biodiversity,
ocean and more. It is said that the most remaining disagreements
are not environmental ones (although the resultant texts are not
to our satisfaction at all), but one way or another related to funding,
trade and global governance.
The text has been already weaken to the extent NGOs see little
to commit the process. FoE-Greenpeace-WWF sent a joint letter to
urge UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to salvage WSSD from this extremely
low common denominator situation. Meanwhile Kofi Annan and many
delegates are said to be afraid of repeating the debacle of the
UN racism conference last year in Durban and they think part of
the reason was having brought the open texts with many parts unresolved
to the main conference. PreCom Chair Salim is said to be determined
therefore not to start discussion on the Declaration until fixing
the PoA and threatening to revise the text with most bracketed parts
simply eliminated to make it manageable for arriving ministers.
If it's done what would be left be an even further watered-down
version, and probably many of us would no longer bother to come
to Johannesburg.
WEAKENING THE UN SYSTEM
A systematic assault to weaken the UN system has been waged by
industrial countries. The issue is centered around the
question of which regime - the UN or trade and financial interests
- shapes present and future global governance for whom. The role
of the General Assembly to monitor and assess implementation of
Agenda 21 and WSSD outcomes is bracketed (124, 125, 129), so the
same as for the ECOSOC (126.) New mandates necessary to strengthen
coordinating power of CSD are also left unresolved with the next
review on implementation in four years by the US and Japan instead
of two (G77) (117, 126 130, 131, 133). The EU proposed the Chief
Executives Board for coordination among UN agencies and non-UN bodies
which powerful non-UN bodies can influence easier (123, 136.)
In a sense this wholesale weakening of the UN is a reflection of
the consistent trend in the past ten years culminating at WSSD,
the highest level meeting of the UN system. The real issue here
is the underlying question of global governance between the one-country-one-vote
UN system and the powerful one-dollar-one-vote international financial
institutions (IFIs), bilateral ECAs and trade bodies, the latter
group often seen overriding sustainable development needs for narrow
northern economic and financial interests. The wordings that can
indicate sustainable development as important policy component of
those self-declared non-UN institutions are carefully bracketed
primarily lead by the US as unnecessary intervention from the UN
side (43, 79, 80, 123, 135, 152). Note that the proposal by the
IMF to set a national bankruptcy procedure and assign itself the
designated international arbitrator is floated in (81).
TRADE
Trade and financing is seen by many delegates the most important
part of the entire text. Since WSSD outcomes are not legally binding,
these debates are actually the extension of forthcoming other negotiations
outside the process particularly the next WTO ministerial conference
in Mexico in 2003 (82.)
The Precautionary Principle the EU is tabling is one of the key
elements and incorporated in Rio conventions ten years ago. It has
been a contentious issue in environmental negotiations and was highlighted
in the WTO Ministerial in Doha where the US argued against EU's
controversial GM-food import ban and potential health risks. Its
placements in the text remain unresolved (19, 43, 94).
Another important UN principle that is under attack is the Common
but Differentiated Responsibilities (11, 12, 16, 35, 43, 76, 84
etc.) which allows different treatment on the commitments and contributions
between industrial and developing countries. This is told often
in conjunction with capacity building needs for developing countries,
thus appears as the matter of how and who to finance the needs.
In Doha the EC, US and Japan focused further market liberalization
in developing countries despite strong developing county opposition,
quoting the WTO principle of non-discriminatory market access worldwide
while keeping their own domestic markets closed to them (83, 84.)
Again, the key UN principle is assaulted by trade interests. Developing
countries and NGOs are questioning the simple assumption that trade
liberalization enhances sustainable development and demanding a
comprehensive social and environmental assessment on the impacts
of GATT and WTO treaties. Bracketing the language for this also
seems to be supported by the EU, US and Japan (43, 86, 88).
This is another example of trade agenda colliding with sustainable
development. The Doha Conference centered the issue of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs) where the developing countries demand for
the rights to protect public health and access to medicines were
contested by the US protecting patent rights of those large pharmaceutical
multinationals. Despite the agreement supposed to have been reached
in Doha, the wordings to protect these rights was bracketed in the
draft (40, 49, 89). Similarly, the US opposed to the wording proposed
by developing countries to ensure fair and equitable benefits derived
from biodiversity. NGOs are demanding to manage genetic resources
as common goods and put them under international scheme. The US
rejects the notion of gene ownership by the original holder (e.g.
indigenous peoples) or the country of origin, thus no sharing of
profits made out of genetic products by manufacturers (the US hasn't
ratified the UN Biodiversity Convention.)
MEAs VS TRADE AGREEMENTS
Multilateral agreements (MEAs, e.g. the climate, biodiversity and
desertification treaties) are critical instruments for, and indeed
the core of, the UN system to enforce global social and environmental
governance. In Doha a new mandate was given to the WTO, rather arbitorarily
from the UN perspective, to determine at the next Ministerial in
2003 if measures taken by those UN instruments pose trade-barrier
or not under its powerful dispute settlement mechanism. There are
the languages in the draft that affirm this mandate and defer the
judgment to the WTO side (86, 123). WSSD is supposed to be the top
venue for UN decision making. It'd be tantamount for the UN system
to declare itself subdued to the non-UN and notoriously undemocratic
entity like the WTO. The result of this debate would impact on the
very foundation of future global governance.
FINANCING
The UN Conference on Financing for Development (FfD) in Monterrey
last March was the twin sister of WSSD. As financing has always
been the most divisive area between developing and industrial countries
it was the Monterrey Conference that was supposed to focus and agree
on funding, and WSSD to be built upon it to devise action programmes.
Although some countries pledged additional funding, Monterrey was
largely a disappointment for G77 and China. In the WSSD process,
industrial countries rejection of no new and additional funding
presents deadly impasse in many parts of the negotiation (12, 21-22,
37, 54, 76, 79, 80, 82, 83, 110, 142). Disaster relief (33), commodity
price stabilization (83, 85), ODA increase (77, 78) and debt cancellation
beyond the HIPC initiative (81) are all put in brackets voiced by
the US, Canada, Japan and the EU wherever they appear in the text.
TARGETS AND TIMEFRAMES
Besides trade and finance a number of environmental issues are
still unresolved. A notable example is energy. During the first
week the US, Australia, Canada and Japan were said to have a position
that they were not going to agree ANY concrete targets and timelines
at WSSD. There are about 25 places where such targets appear throughout
the draft text. Among them are poverty eradication, sanitation,
and biodiversity loss (20, 21, 29, 40, 58, 98 etc.) Unless key industrial
countries like Japan change their staunch opposition to any new
concrete targets coupledwith their no additional funding position
there seems the very little new coming out from WSSD in Johannesburg.
Who'll care, then?
ENERGY
In the same context, Japan and Australia in contact group meetings
are voicing their opposition to having a numeric target on renewable
energy while the EU and Indonesia proposing 15% and 5%, respectively,
of primary energy supply by 2010 (16). Here, G77 and China is de
facto taken over by group chair Iran representing OPEC interests,
and supported by the US and Japan, inserted the words "fossil
fuel" side by side where renewables are mentioned (8, 16).
Note that Agenda 21 and the previous versions of the draft didn't
contain th words at all. Tuvalu's strong resistance against these
insertions were eventually ignored by the chair. In conjunction
with this stalemate on energy, a rather weak language to "ensure"
the Kyoto Protocol entry into force was tabled by the EU, weak because
the formulation of paragraph subjects those who did or intend to
ratify while Norway proposed a stronger call for ratification by
every country aiming at the US, Australia and Canada. Both wordings
are left for further consultation (34).
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY
The WTO and other trade agreements center to protect interests
of large multinational corporations while there is no binding international
rules and legal frameworks to regulate and account activities of
those multinationals. The language for this (43, 123) supported
by G77 and China is strongly opposed by Japan with support from
the US and EU who consider voluntary OECD guidelines as the basis
and have been rejecting any legally binding framework on multinationals
so far.
CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION
"No vote of confidence" was echoed by NGOs that have
worked on this form of participation the UN has introduced since
the last COP meeting of the Biodiversity Convention. The process
narrows down diverse civil society participants into just a handful
of Major Group representatives, while businesses are always given
their sole slot ensured, let alone many countries include industry
lobbyists in their delegations. Attendance of government delegations
at MSHD meetings last week largely ended in disappointment and it
is unclear how views presented would be incorporated into official
positions, if any, and followed up. MSHD in WSSD process is a test
case for the UN and there is a danger that this will be extended
into other UN conferences as the primary means for NGO input.
Meanwhile, most of the public participation section in the draft
is bracketed by G77 and China (123, 147, 151, 155), and there is
one place which refers government AND civil society accountabilities
(122). Here, the definition of civil society which many NGOs have
been working hard to gain for years is undermined by including businesses.
Implication of this for NGO community would go far beyond WSSD.
NGOs are lobbying to the formulation to suggest corporate responsibility
rather than civil society's.
NGO participation of the Bali meeting itself has been slightly
improved as we are now able to observe most of informal plenaries
and contact group meetings with major negotiating texts available
at the Documentation Desk, which wasn't the case at the beginning.
There is however a very strong sense of dissatisfaction among NGOs
about the way public participation is handled besides (lack of)
the substance of the current negotiating texts (as shown in the
letter mentioned above.) Over the weekend WALHI and Friends of the
Earth organized mass gathering nearby the conference center and
during the second week more public actions are planned by various
NGO groups outside.
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